The fragmentation of self and others: the role of the default mode network in post-traumatic stress disorder by Chan, Aldrich
Pepperdine University 
Pepperdine Digital Commons 
Theses and Dissertations 
2016 
The fragmentation of self and others: the role of the default mode 
network in post-traumatic stress disorder 
Aldrich Chan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Chan, Aldrich, "The fragmentation of self and others: the role of the default mode network in post-
traumatic stress disorder" (2016). Theses and Dissertations. 660. 
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/etd/660 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more 




Graduate School of Education and Psychology 
THE FRAGMENTATION OF SELF AND OTHERS: 
 
THE ROLE OF THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK IN 
 













A clinical dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction 
of the requirements for the degree of 




Louis Cozolino, Ph.D. – Dissertation Chairperson 
 







under the guidance of a Faculty Committee and approved by its members, has been submitted to 











Louis Cozolino, Ph.D. – Chairperson 
 
Aaron Aviera, Ph.D. 
 


























© Copyright by Aldrich Chan (2016) 
All Rights Reserved 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... v	  
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... vi	  
DEDICATION .............................................................................................................................. vii	  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................... viii	  
VITA .............................................................................................................................................. ix	  
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. xii	  
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background ........................................................................................ 1	  
The Default Mode Network ................................................................................................ 1	  
The Default Mode Network: Function ................................................................................ 2	  
The Default Mode Network: Structure ............................................................................... 8	  
The Development of the DMN ......................................................................................... 13	  
Socio-emotional Impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ............................................ 15	  
Purpose and Importance of this Study .............................................................................. 16	  
Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 16	  
Chapter 2: Methodology and Procedures ...................................................................................... 17	  
Chapter 3: The Effects of PTSD on the Default Mode Network .................................................. 19	  
The Default Mode Network and Self ................................................................................ 19	  
Fragmentation of Time ..................................................................................................... 35	  
The DMN and Social Processes ........................................................................................ 39	  
Moral Judgment and the DMN ......................................................................................... 46	  
Chapter 4: Conclusion and Discussion ......................................................................................... 49	  
Methodological Limitations .............................................................................................. 49	  
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 51	  
Clinical Implications ......................................................................................................... 54	  
Discussion and Directions for Future Research ................................................................ 57	  
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 63	  
APPENDIX: IRB Review Letter .................................................................................................. 76	  
 v 
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 1. The Default Mode Network: Associated Regions and Functions ................................... 11	  
Table 2. Self-related Functions ..................................................................................................... 20	  
Table 3. Impact of Trauma and PTSD on the Default Mode Network ......................................... 23	  
Table 4. Social Cognitive Functions ............................................................................................. 39	  
Table 5. Etiological Categorization of Studies ............................................................................. 50	  
Table 6. Neuropsychological Profile of DMN Dysfunction: Traumatized Resting State ............ 53	  
 vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 





I would like to dedicate this dissertation to all survivors of trauma. 
 
May you kindle a light of meaning in the darkest of hours 
May your fictional truths play in the spotlight of your mind 
May you make peace with your demons and be cradled by your values 
May you find unity and love in the process 
 
Aldrich Chan 




It is with tremendous gratitude that I acknowledge Dr. Louis Cozolino for his guidance in 
the thick brush strokes of life, neuroscience and psychology. His mentorship has challenged me 
to rise beyond my current skill set and adopt novel ways of thinking. With deep respect, I would 
also like to recognize Dr. Aaron Aviera for his superb supervision, raising my awareness of the 
intersubjective field and introducing me to the world of somatic experiencing. I would like to 
thank Dr. Susan Himelstein for fomenting my growth as a clinician and supporting me along the 
way. 
I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Edward Shafranske for unveiling the 
profound importance of subjective experience and symbolic play through his supervision. 
Likewise, I am very appreciative of Dr. Shelly Harrell, whose presence will always be a 
reminder that my work is rooted in humanity. My sincerest gratitude to Dr. Daniel Siegel, his 
encouragement and work has continued to inspire me to think creatively, globally, and 
empathically.  
I am ever grateful for my mother, father and brother for being so present and supportive 
in all of my endeavors.  
 ix 
VITA 
EDUCATION    
Pepperdine University, Los Angeles, CA                                       September 2012-Present 
Doctor of Psychology in Clinical Psychology 
Anticipated Graduation: September 2016 
Dissertation Chair: Louis Cozolino, Ph.D. 
Title: The Fragmentation of Self and Others: The Role of the Default Mode Network in PTSD 
 
The Chicago School of Professional Psychology, Los Angeles, CA                  December 2011 
Master of Arts in Clinical Psychology, Specialization in Marriage and Family Therapy  
 
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada                                                                   September 2009 
Bachelor of Arts with Honors in Psychology   
 
LANGUAGES                                                           
Spanish: Advanced Level: Competent in Therapy and Assessment. 
Cantonese: Intermediate level of speaking. 
 
CLINICAL EXPERIENCE                                                           
University of Miami/Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami, FL July 2015-Present 
Ryder Trauma Center 
Pre-Doctoral Fellow – Neuropsychology Intern 
Licensed Clinical Supervisor: Susan Ireland, Ph.D., Gisela Puentes, Psy.D., Sheba Kumbhani, 
Ph.D., Diane Netto, Ph.D. 
 
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, West Hollywood, CA                      July 2014-June 2015 
Department of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation 
Adult Neuropsychology Extern 
Licensed Clinical Supervisor: Jeffrey Wertheimer, Ph.D., ABPP-CN, Miyeoung Jo Ph.D., 
ABPP-CN, Ludmila Zaytsev Ph.D., Dale Sherman, Ph.D, Anne Gottuso, Ph.D. 
 
Children’s Hospital Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA            October 2014-June 2015 
Department of Orthopaedics and Sports Medicine 
Pediatric Neuropsychology Extern 
Licensed Clinical Supervisor: Anita Hamilton, Ph.D., ABPP-CN 
 
Union Rescue Mission, Los Angeles, CA Sept. 2012-June 2015       
Psychology Extern 




Pepperdine Community Mental Health Clinic, Los Angeles, CA         June 2013-June 2015  
Psychology Extern 
Licensed Clinical Supervisor: Aaron Aviera, Ph.D., Edward Shafranske, Ph.D., ABPP 
(September 2014) 
 
Children’s Hospital Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA                        July 2013-July 2014  
Department of Orthopaedics and Sports Medicine 
Pediatric Neuropsychology Extern 
Licensed Clinical Supervisor: Anita Hamilton, Ph.D., ABPP-CN 
 
Positive Alternatives for Youth, Panorama City, CA                     January 2011-December 2011 
MFT Trainee 
Licensed Clinical Supervisors: Vickie Parker, LMFT and Joni Edelman, LMFT 
 
ACADEMIC HONORS/AWARDS                                                         
Conrad Hilton Foundation Fellowship                                  Fall 2012 
• Fellowship endowed for working with underserved populations 
 
CLINICAL SUPERVISION AND TEACHING EXPERIENCE                
Pepperdine University, Los Angeles, CA                                September 2014-July 2015 
Peer Supervisor  
Aaron Aviera, Ph.D. 
 
Pepperdine University, Los Angeles, CA        September 2014- December 2015 
Teaching Assistant – Clinical Neuropsychology 
Harold Burke, Ph.D., ABMP 
 
Pepperdine University, Los Angeles, CA                      September 2013- December 2013 
Faculty Assistant – Cognitive Foundations of Psychology 
Louis Cozolino, Ph.D. 
 
The Chicago School of Professional Psychology, Los Angeles, CA Sept. 2011-March 2012 
Teaching Assistant – Biological Basis of Behavior  
Richard Sinacola, Ph.D. 
 
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE   
Mindsight Institute, Santa Monica, CA                       October 2014-Present 
Mindsight Intern 
Daniel J. Siegel, M.D. 
 
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada October 2011-October 2012 
Carleton Department of Neuroscience & Child Studies  
Research Assistant  
Amedeo D’Angiulli, Ph.D. 
 
 xi 
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada                September 2009-Nov. 2009 
Carleton Department of Neuroscience & Child Studies  
Research Assistant  
Amedeo D’Angiulli, Ph.D. 
 
PUBLICATIONS                                                             
Siegel, D. & Chan, A. (2016) Play and the Default Mode: Interpersonal Neurobiology, Self and 
Creativity. Manuscript in preparation.  
 
D’Angiulli, A., Runge, M., Faulker, A., Zakizadeh, J., Chan, A., & Morcos, S. (2013). 
Vividness of visual imagery and incidental recall of verbal cues, phenomenological 
availability reflects long term memory accessibility. Frontiers in Psychology, 4(1).  
 
Chan, A. (2012). Review of “Imagine that: Studies in Imagined Interactions.” Journal of 
Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 32(1), 95-100. 
 
PRESENTATIONS                                                            
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, CA               May 2015 
Samuel Oschin Comprehensive Cancer Institute  
• Presented on the relevance of Acceptance and Commitment based therapy and 
Mindsight for patients with cancer and faculty at Cedars-Sinai 
 
Union Rescue Mission, Los Angeles, CA September 2013 
• Presented on chronic pain to a group of homeless men residing at a shelter 
 
Positive Alternatives for Youth, Panorama City, CA            August 2011 
• Presented the effects of substances on the brain to a high school 
 
The Chicago School of Professional Psychology, Los Angeles, CA   November 2011 
• Guest Lectured on “The Effects of Psychotherapy on the Brain” to two Masters level 
classes 
 
VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE                                                           
Cross-Cultural Solutions, Bahia, Brazil April 2012 – May 2012 
Dissertation Assistant, Los Angeles, CA             October 2011-December 2011 
United Planet, Cusco, Peru (120 hours)  June-July 2008 
Habitat for Humanity, San Jose, Costa Rica 2004-2005  
ADA tutoring, San Jose, Costa Rica 2004-2005 
Big Brother/Big Sister program, San Jose, Costa Rica 2003-2005  
 
AFFILIATIONS         
Member of Global Association for Interpersonal Neurobiology 
Member of the International Neuropsychology Society 
Division 40: Clinical Neuropsychology  
Division 56: Trauma Psychology 
Division 22: Rehabilitation Psychology 
 xii 
ABSTRACT 
In Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), social and emotional dysfunction has been 
interpreted as a secondary consequence of the broad impact of amygdala and fear circuitry 
dysregulation. However, research in social neuroscience has uncovered a number of neural 
systems involved in attachment and emotional regulation that may be impacted by trauma. One 
example is the Default Mode Network (DMN), which is implicated in human beings’ sense of 
self and ability to connect with others.  
This qualitative study explored the impact of physical and emotional traumata on the 
structures and functions of the DMN. The goal was to determine if dysregulation of the DMN 
could account for aspects of the psychological and social dysfunction found in PTSD. This study 
explored the following two questions:  
1. What does the research literature tell us about the role of the DMN?  
2. How does trauma impact DMN functioning?  
The DMN has been associated primarily with autobiographical recall, self-referential 
processing, social cognition, prospection, and moral sensitivity. The DMN appears to support 
internal reflective capacity, further maintaining and connecting self-functions and social 
cognition. Trauma results in internetwork rigidity, as well as overall reductions in DMN activity, 
volume, and connectivity. These objective changes result in a Traumatized Resting State (TRS), 
characterized by increased Salience Network connectivity and reductions in Central Executive 
functioning. Studies suggest that a TRS develops in reaction to acute trauma, even before the 
development of PTSD, and may continue despite the stabilization of other networks. Overall, 




Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
It is currently estimated that the human body is composed of 37.2 trillion cells (Bianconi 
et al., 2013). These cells are relationally bound, forming a web of complexity and intelligence. 
Over the course of human evolution, cell activity led to differentiation, resulting in the 
emergence of distinct anatomical functions. The brain is predicted to be composed of 86 billion 
neurons (Herculano-Houzel, 2009). For millions of years, human brains have evolved in 
adaptation to their environment. Natural selection, epigenetics, exaptation, and interacting 
experiences led to the development of specialized neural systems, increasing the potential for 
humans to survive, and even thrive, under precarious and often unpredictable conditions. As 
brains advanced in their development, so did they give rise to a sense of self, importantly, 
providing humans with the capacity to introspect, creating a window into another aspect of the 
natural world, that is, the world as it is reflected in the mind. From reactive organisms guided by 
instinctual impulses to thinking beings that harbor curiosity, interests, and abstract thought, the 
trajectory of evolution has certainly generated features that distinguish humans from other 
animals. Despite such advantages, an increase in the complexity of a system is often paralleled 
by an increase in possible problems, one example being high rates of mental disorders (World 
Health Organization, 2004).  
The Default Mode Network 
Human experience is significantly defined by the ability to retrieve memories, evaluate 
present experiences, and construct imagined scenarios. Many of the distinguishing characteristics 
of humans rest on their ability to view themselves as objects of their own reflection. These 
metacognitive capacities provide humans with a unique opportunity to further the development 




optimizing survival advantage. In fact, humans spend an estimated 46.9% of their time engaged 
in such introspective processes (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010).  
Marcus Raichle’s (2010) research group found only a slight decrease of the brain’s intake 
of energy when resting (less than 5%). In addition, they established that approximately 60-80% 
of the brain’s energy consumption is dedicated to internally directed processes, independent of 
external stimuli. Elevated activations found in regions of the brain during resting state reflect a 
Default Mode of brain functioning (Raichle et al., 2001), that has since been termed the Default 
Mode Network (DMN).  
The DMN is characterized by coherent low frequency neuronal oscillations (0.1 Hz) that 
decrease during goal-directed activity, whilst returning to its frequency state during an 
engagement with introspective processes (Broyd et al., 2009). Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos 
(2007) postulated that this coherence is indicative of temporal synchrony between the various 
regions of the brain associated with the DMN. This synchrony suggests the existence of 
interconnected processes functioning in harmony.  
The Default Mode Network: Function 
Brain lesions, imaging, post-mortem studies, and research on psychological, psychiatric, 
and neurological conditions have all contributed to compounding evidence supporting the close 
relationship between neural and mental functioning (Lezak, Howieson, Bigler, & Tranel, 2012).  
In this vein, it is logical to think that the experience of subjectivity, and the mental capacity 
enabling this experience, may relate to DMN activity. In fact, the DMN has been correlated with 
functions such as autobiographical recall, prospection (Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009), self-
referential processing (Lanius, Bluhm, & Frewen, 2011), social cognition (Mars et al., 2012), and 




will provide deeper insight into how these fundamental processes fit together, facilitating the 
overall experience of subjectivity. Moreover, such an understanding will provide the grounds to 
understand how pathological processes and DMN dysfunction may lead to psychological 
disarray.  
Autobiographical recall refers to the process of remembering the past. According to 
Spreng and colleagues (2009), reconstructing a scene from autobiographical memory requires the 
projection of oneself into past memories and the retrieval of spatial and temporal information. 
The ability to remember the past allows people to learn from their mistakes and the mistakes of 
others. Importantly, this capacity also serves as the bedrock for the development of identity and 
the formation of a coherent self. 
Along with the ability to remember past events, the DMN has been found to be active 
when an individual imagines the future, an ability known as prospection. Mental simulation of 
several potential futures is adaptive, as it enables one to plan in advance in order to maximize the 
chances of meeting a goal (Spreng et al., 2009). This capacity builds upon autobiographical 
recall, utilizing one’s ability to retrieve historical information to further improve one’s current 
state. Notably, imagination can be just as maladaptive as it can be adaptive, as some simulations 
of the future may be negatively biased due to their contingency upon the experiences of an 
individual’s history. A traumatic history may result in a form of cognitive rigidity that constricts 
the application of adaptive and functional solutions. This process further promulgates anxiety 
and helplessness that may have once served as a successful defense against the trauma 
experienced (Cozolino, 2010).  
Self-referential processing is the process of developing mental representations that are 




2012). These representations may have a positive, neutral, or negative valence. An individual’s 
biological constitution and developmental experiences determine the degree to which self-
referencing and self-reflection become positive or negative experiences. Biases in cognitive-
affective SRPs will influence the organism’s behavior in its environment, resulting in adaptive or 
maladaptive decision-making processes. Given the interdependent nature of such processes, a 
positive or negative perception may affect one’s perception of others and ultimately one’s 
interpersonal functioning (Frewen et al., 2011). Not surprisingly, a person’s capacity to be aware 
of emotions is intimately connected with his/her ability to reflect on his/her own internal process 
(Lanius et al., 2011). Flexibility and accuracy in social cognition are thus contingent upon the 
quality of internal development, as well as the capacity for self-reflection. 
In this context, social cognition has been associated with DMN functioning and may be 
defined as “the perception, interpretation and processing of all information relating to a person’s 
environment and relationship” (Moskowitz, as cited in Nietlisbach & Maercker, 2009, p. 383). 
Nietlisbach and Maercker (2009) identified four social cognitive functions necessary for 
successful social interactions: theory of mind, empathy, emotional resonance, and experiences of 
perceived social exclusion. Two key elements in this construct are theory of mind and empathy. 
Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to imagine the thoughts and feelings of others (Spreng & 
Grady, 2010). ToM is cognitive (Nietlisbach & Maercker, 2009) and necessitates an observer to 
be capable of recognizing that another has a mind and assume what that mental state is (Saxe, 
2006). Saxe (2006) emphasized another level to consider, called representational theory of mind, 
which is how a mental state is represented in the other. Empathy is affective in nature 
(Nietlisbach & Maercker, 2009) and can be defined as a shared emotional state that emerges as a 




2003). ToM is subsumed in empathy (Nazarov et al., 2014). Emotional resonance is a non-
conscious capacity whereby an individual automatically engages in an implicit response 
(affective resonance) via detection of non-verbal communications and other social signals, made 
possible by neurobiological mechanisms and circuitry dedicated to social processing (i.e., mirror 
neurons, spindle cells, the DMN; Nietlisbach & Maercker, 2009). With the capacity for effective 
interpersonal communication, social experiences become consolidated and reflected upon 
without perturbation. In contrast, perceived social exclusion from a community may have meant 
death in humanity’s evolutionary history. Thus, survival may depend on the ability to detect 
rejection. In fact, lacking positive relationships often leads to “loneliness, guilt, jealousy, anxiety, 
and depression…higher incidences of psychopathology and have reduced immune functioning” 
(Nietlisbach & Maercker, 2009, p. 393). 
 With each interconnected function building on one another, researchers have also found 
that moral decision-making recruits DMN activation (Reniers et al., 2012). Reniers and 
colleagues (2012) further characterized moral decision-making as based on the internalization of 
socially and societally accepted values of a particular environment, followed by the evaluation of 
actions based on these values. The consistent application of these moral principles in everyday 
decision-making is what Lind (2008) has termed moral judgment competency. This competency 
includes the degree of alignment with certain principles and its level of integration with an 
individual’s capacity to reason and act.  
In unification of other DMN functions, Reniers and colleagues (2012) supported the 
notion that:  
The acceptability of the actions described in scenarios are based on the integration of 
information about other people’s beliefs and intentions (ToM), reference to the these 
peoples feelings (empathy), and reflection upon one’s own feelings, norms and values 





Overall, Lanius and colleagues (2011) defined the DMN as a network that “aids in serving to 
consolidate, stabilize and set the context for future information processing” (p. 339). 
The DMN’s relationship to internal tasks further extends to mind wandering or 
daydreaming. Baars (2002) introduced the Global Workspace theory, suggesting that mind 
wandering really arises as input from internal and external sources attempt to gain access into the 
limited capacity of a central network. According to Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, and 
Schooler (2009), mind wandering activates both the DMN and executive network, with 
activation being at its peak when an individual is not aware of the process. They have suggested 
that mind wandering may be understood as a mental state that supports cooperation between the 
two networks. In this model, DMN activation is most active in effortful introspection, whereas 
there are gradations of DMN and executive network activations during mind wandering and 
executive network functions during a task. Notably, when the mind decides to wander, it 
wanders to thoughts or feelings associated to self or others. Research by Killingsworth and 
Gilbert (2010) has revealed that human mind wandering is disposed towards negativity and that 
increased mind wandering is associated with lower levels of happiness.  
In contrast, Smallwood and Schooler (2015) suggested that mind-wandering has also 
been linked to: (a) improved capacity for delayed gratification via future planning in self-
generated thoughts, which itself has been predictive of positive attributes such as greater 
intelligence; (b) creativity or the capacity to generate novel creative thoughts, especially during 
simple tasks or in daily life; (c) meaning, whereby engaging in mental time travel, particularly 
thinking about specific remembered or anticipated events can enhance self-reported meaning in 




(d) mental breaks, where mind-wandering (particularly future-oriented thoughts) has been found 
to reduce undesirable mood states associated with engaging in boring task 
Another salient characteristic of the DMN is its involvement with other neural networks. 
More specifically, the DMN does not work in isolation; rather, it functions in relation to other 
neural networks: specifically, the Salience Network (SN) and Central Executive Network (CEN). 
The SN is a neural network that determines the importance of internal and external stimuli 
(salience) as related to an individual’s context, further orienting an individual to internal activity 
or the environment. It is composed of the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior insula, anterior 
cingulate cortex (Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008), amygdala, and putamen (Patel, Spreng, 
Shin, & Girard, 2012). The CEN is activated when the brain is engaged in a task, and its central 
nodes are the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex (Sridharan et al., 2008). 
The SN has been found to be responsible for transitioning between the DMN and the CEN 
(Goulden et al., 2014). Anticevic and colleagues (2012) defined the DMN as a constellation of 
areas in the brain anti-correlated to fronto-parietal regions, further labeling the DMN as a task 
negative network (TNN) in contrast to a task positive network (TPN), as the DMN deactivates 
when one is engaged in an external task. This notion however, has been found to be incorrect, as 
tasks involving self and social processes have been found to activate the DMN (Mars et al., 
2012). 
Notably, there is a commonality underlying every function that has been associated with 
the DMN: namely, its underlying role as a bridge to internal reflective capacity, the capacity for 
which has been found to connect self and social processes. Thus, it is a network dedicated to 




The Default Mode Network: Structure 
Areas composing the DMN include the medial pre-frontal cortex (mPFC), the precuneus 
(Raichle et al., 2001), lateral parietal and temporal cortices (Spreng et al., 2009), and the 
Cingulate Cortex (primarily PCC; Buckner, Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). A more extensive list can 
be viewed in Figure 1.   
The mPFC is a central node in the DMN, having among the highest baseline metabolic 
activity at rest (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001). In addition, it has dense 
connections to the limbic system and has been found to be involved with monitoring and 
modulating emotions arising from these regions. Some models suggest divisions in the mPFC 
that correspond to conceptual and embodied self-awareness (Lanius et al., 2011). The ventral 
mPFC (vmPFC) is seen as a key player for embodied self-awareness, whereas the dorsal mPFC 
(dmPFC) has been connected with conceptual awareness. Lanius and colleagues (2011) defined 
conceptual emotional awareness as a linguistic and rational process that enables reflection, 
interpretation, and decision-making in relation to an embodied emotion or sensation. In contrast, 
embodied emotional/self-awareness is intuitive; “based on sensing, feeling and acting, [it] tends 
to be spontaneous and creative and is usually lived in the present moment” (p. 333). In relation, 
Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio (2000) described the vmPFC as “a repository of dispositionally 
recorded linkages between factual knowledge and bioregulatory states” (p. 296).  In a meta-
analytic study, Etkin and Wager (2007) discovered that in relation to other anxiety disorders, 
diminished vmPFC activation is unique to PTSD. They also viewed the vmPFC as playing an 
integral role to the Somatic Marker hypothesis, which describes decision-making as a “process 




Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 2 
Bilateral inferior parietal and posterior temporal around the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) 5 
Hippocampal formation 2, 4  
Inferior parietal lobule 2, 7 
Insula 7 
Lateral parietal cortices 1, 4, 7  
Lateral temporal lobes 7 
Medial posterior cortex 5 
Medial pre-frontal cortex (mPFC) 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 
Middle temporal gyrus 3 
Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)1, 2, 4, 5, 6 




1) Bianconi et al., 2013 
2) Buckner et al., 2008 
3) Daniels, Bluhm, & Lanius, 2013 
4) Fair et al., 2008 
5) Mars et al., 2012 
6) Raichle et al., 2001 
7) Spreng et al., 2009 
Figure 1. The Default Mode Network: Associated regions. 
As a convergence zone for self and emotionally based information, decreases in vmPFC 
activation are indicative of irregularities in potential higher-order intuitive states. Interestingly, 
researchers have also associated vmPFC to self-referential cognition, and the dmPFC when 
forming impressions about others; however, it is “more akin to a gradient than a true functional 
dissociation” (Wagner et al., 2012, p. 455). It has been associated with information processing 
relevant to the self and considering the minds of other people (Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 
2005).  
The parietal lobes emerged evolutionarily from the hippocampus (Cozolino, 2010), and 
are related to somatosensory perception, bodily perception, visual-spatial orientation, memory, 
symbolic synthesis, and cross-modal matching (Beaumont, 2008). As such, the parietal cortices 
are necessary for creating internal maps of the environment and the self in relation to the 
environment. The parietal lobes may well be supporting mPFC-mediated self-related processes 




Two studies (Buccione, Fadda, Serra, Caltagirone, & Carlesimo, 2008; Kapur, Ellison, 
Smith, McLellan, & Burrows, 1992) found that bilateral lesions in the temporal lobes play a 
significant role in memory for past events, affecting both autobiographical (i.e., episodic, 
semantic) and non-autobiographical (i.e., public events, general semantic knowledge) memory. 
In addition to the mPFC and parietal cortices, the bilateral temporal lobes appear to provide 
context to this formation of self.  
Ablation studies have found that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) contributes to the 
brain’s ability to detect and correct errors, regulating both cognitive and emotional processing 
(Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000).  This region, though associated to DMN functioning in some 
studies, has been increasingly understood as a central component in the SN. In contrast, the 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) has been implicated in evaluative functions and mediation of 
interactions of emotional and memory-related processes (Maddock, Garrett, & Buonocore, 
2003).  In conjunction with the mPFC, parietal cortices, and temporal lobes, the cingulate gyrus 
functions as a primer for current and future social engagement. Overall, the PCC has been related 
to DMN functioning in more studies, and as such will be understood as a primary node.  
A meta-analytic review of studies of the precuneus suggests that activations in this region 
are involved in mental imagery strategies related to the self, facilitation of successful episodic 
memory retrieval (Cavanna & Trible, 2006), and the integration of mental images (D’Angiulli et 
al., 2013). In coordination with previously implicated regions, these regions provide for an 
autobiographically constructed process localized in the imaginal and physical world that must 





The Default Mode Network: Associated Regions and Functions 
Region Function 
Medial prefrontal cortex (Mitchell et al., 
2005) 
Information processing relevant to self and 
considering the minds of other people  
Parietal lobes (Beaumont, 2008) Somatosensory perception, bodily perception, 
visual-spatial orientation, memory, symbolic 
synthesis, and cross-modal matching 
Temporal lobes (Buccione et al., 2008; 
Kapur et al., 1992) 
Role in memory for past events, affecting both 
autobiographical (i.e., episodic, semantic) and 
non-autobiographical (i.e., public events, general 
semantic knowledge) memory. 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (Bush et al., 
2000)   
Detect and correct errors, regulating both cognitive 
and emotional processing 
Posterior Cingulate Cortex (Maddock et al., 
2003)   
Evaluative functions and mediation of interactions 
of emotional and memory-related processes 
Precuneus (Cavanna & Trible, 2006), Mental imagery strategies related to the self, 
facilitation of successful episodic memory 
retrieval 
Temporo-parietal Junction (Saxe, 2006)  Theory of mind, empathy 
 
Li, Mai, and Liu (2014) conducted a meta-analysis on the DMN, encountering three main 
subsystems thereof: the vmPFC in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, critically 
involved with processing emotional features; the anterior mPFC and PCC, responsible for the 
elaboration of the experiential feelings of self; and the dmPFC and the temporo-parietal junction 
(TPJ), central to ToM (mentalizing) and morality. The PCC was also found to be a central node 
involved with explicit emotional engagement, emotional word processing, face perception, 
implicit emotional engagement during self-directed attention or evaluation, and autobiographical 
memory. The role of the mPFC was found to be critical in all of the studies, supporting the 
simulation theory, stating that humans’ social cognitive functions are contingent upon past 
experiences, which serve as a platform for understanding others. It was also indicated that mPFC 
activation increases with the complexity of tasks performed, with this complexity also 




bottom-up process, where non-conscious, effortless information processing emerges into 
effortful cognitive processing.  
Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, and Buckner (2010) yielded similar findings, 
encountering two distinct systems. They labeled the first subsystem the dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex subsystem, including the dmPFC, TPJ, lateral temporal cortex, and temporal pole. The 
second subsystem they called the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, which includes the 
vmPFC, posterior inferior parietal lobule, retrospelenial cortex, parahippocampal cortex, and 
hippocampal formation. They discovered selective activation within these networks when 
engaging in different tasks. The dmPFC subsystem was preferentially activated when individuals 
were making self-referential judgments about a present situation. In contrast, the MTL was 
engaged during episodic judgments about personal future. 
At the neuronal level, the DMN contains Von Economo Neurons or Spindle cells, which 
are found in the ACC, anterior insula, and areas of the prefrontal lobes. Anatomically, they are 
found linking each one of these areas together and also extend, connecting with the amygdala, 
thalamus, hypothalamus, and periaqueductal gray matter. To this day, they have only been found 
in large-brained social mammals (Cozolino, 2014). It is hypothesized that they are an “obligatory 
neuronal adaptation in very large brains, permitting fast information processing and transfer 
along highly specific projections and that evolved in relation to emerging social behaviors in 
select groups of mammals” (Butti, Sherwood, Hakeem, Allman, & Hof, 2009, p. 254). Mirror 
neurons have also been found in areas associated to the DMN: more specifically, the inferior 
frontal gyrus (Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009) and rostral region of the right 
superior parietal lobule (Iacoboni et al., 1999). Mirror neurons are activated while observing 




Ramachandran (2009) called them “Gandhi neurons or empathy neurons” (5:56).  He also 
discussed how mirror neurons allowed for a “Lamarckian evolution” (3:51), as they enable one 
to imitate and emulate others, learning a skill that would usually take years, or even generations, 
in a matter of minutes.  
Situated in convergence zones of higher order motor, visual, and emotional processing, 
mirror neurons have the unique advantage of being activated during both observation and action 
(Cross & Iacoboni, 2013). Incorporated in these systems are blueprints of others as well as the 
internal maps of the spaces we inhabit. Somatic experiences, survival needs, and strategies for 
goal achievement are also embedded in these systems (Cozolino, 2014).  
Over the last twenty years, mirror systems have helped us to understand how our brains 
link together in the synchronization of such group behaviors as hunting, dancing, and 
emotional attunement. They are most likely involved in the learning of manual skills, the 
evolution of gestural communication, spoken language, group cohesion, and empathy. 
(Jeannerod, as cited in Cozolino, 2014, p. 147) 
 
It would be interesting to determine whether Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) results in 
irregularities within the cytoarchitecture of one or both of these types of neurons. 
The Development of the DMN 
From a developmental standpoint, it is interesting to note that during infancy (up to 2 
years), humans lack a sense of self. Though a self may have been developing during that time, 
with experiences becoming embedded into implicit memory systems, a stable and continuous 
sense of self capable of introspection simply does not exist during early infancy. As time goes 
on, the brain develops in interaction with its social environment, giving rise to a sense of self. 
Thus, humans “seem to emerge into self-awareness from an undifferentiated sense of 




It is estimated that self-recognition begins around the age of 2 (Rochat, 2003), which 
parallels the approximation of the beginning of explicit memory (Siegler, 1998). Following these 
milestones arises ToM, beginning at approximately 3 years of age, with representational ToM 
arising around 5 years of age (Saxe, 2006). Self-concept, in contrast, has been estimated to 
develop only around the ages of 7-8 (Leflot, Onghena, & Colpin, 2010). As self and social 
processes develop alongside each other, so are these experiences embedded in the DMN. These 
two seemingly independent constructs appear to be only separated by humans’ necessity to 
categorize, as through the lens of the DMN, self and social processes are bound.  
With this context in mind, it is interesting to note that the DMN has been found to 
stabilize by the ages of 9-12 (Thomason et al., 2008). Thomason and colleagues (2008) 
concluded that anterior-posterior integration of a 9-year-old was comparable to adult levels and 
that 7-9 year olds’ levels remained significantly different. Through convergent structural and 
functional connectivity analyses, Supekar and colleagues (2010) demonstrated immature 
connectivity between the PCC-mPFC along the cingulum, a bundle of white matter fibers 
projecting from the cingulate gyrus to the entorhinal cortex1, allowing communication with the 
limbic system. This may be reflected in immaturity in one of the DMN’s subsystems related to 
self-referential processing (Li et al., 2014). In some cases, they encountered non-existent to weak 
PCC-left MTL connectivity in second and third graders (7-9 years old). It is interesting to note 
that only between the ages of 8-13 do children begin to develop a mature grasp of delayed 
gratification. This includes the cognitive ability to inhibit arousing thoughts by employing 
abstract strategies to attain a greater reward in the future (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1992). 
These findings echo the growth of metacognitive capacity, allowing for the differentiation and 
                                                
1 Resides between the hippocampus and mPFC, highly connected to the limbic system (Lindemer, Salat, Leritz, 




development of a stable sense of self. It is possible that around the age of 7, there is an 
emergence and subsequent acquisition of a wider range of self and social capacities, and it is not 
until the age of 8 and beyond that these functions begin to take form and stabilize, which is 
reflected in DMN functioning.  
Socio-emotional Impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder  
If necessity is the mother of invention, then evolution itself has created the necessity for 
psychotherapy by shaping a brain that is vulnerable to a wide array of difficulties. 
(Cozolino, 2010, p. 305)  
 
One diagnosis that is in dire need of further understanding in order to improve treatment 
is PTSD, currently characterized by intrusions, avoidance, arousal, and negative mood and 
cognitions (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). In this context, dysfunctional 
interpersonal relationships have been understood as a secondary consequence of PTSD, yet many 
individuals with PTSD have been shown to exhibit violence (Galovsky & Lyons, 2004), abusive 
behaviors (Stinson, Becker, & Sales, 2008; Thomas et al., 2013), relational difficulties (Galovsky 
& Lyons, 2004; Maercker & Horn, 2012), and an increased chance of suicide (Stevens et al., 
2013).  
Similar to understanding neuroanatomical functions through brain lesions, the function of 
brain networks can be understood by examining how alterations in functional connectivity affect 
corresponding psychological processes. Given the associated functions of the DMN, significant 
increases and decreases in activity and connectivity within and between DMN regions may 
hinder an individual’s ability to relate to himself/herself and others. Confluences of 
dysfunctional psychological processes are likely mirrored in the neural incoherence encountered 




Purpose and Importance of this Study 
According to the National Institute of Mental Health (n.d.), 3.5% of U.S. adults suffer 
from PTSD, which is approximately 1.3% of the U.S population. This percentage is equivalent to 
around 40 million people; 36.6% of these cases are classified as severe. Such a high prevalence 
rate, in conjunction with difficulties in this demographic, are forcing researchers and clinicians to 
look beyond the confines of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (APA, 2013) for more 
comprehensive ways to diagnose and treat these serious and chronic consequences. This study 
sought to examine extant literature on PTSD and social neuroscience to determine how deficits 
in the DMN may contribute to post-traumatic symptomology. 
Research Questions 
This study focused on the following research questions:  
1. What does the research literature tell us about the role of the DMN?  




Chapter 2: Methodology and Procedures 
Studies were identified from seven databases: Science Direct, Frontiers, Wiley, Google 
Scholar, Psych articles, Pubmed, and Psychinfo. These databases were used to facilitate a 
comprehensive collection of empirically reviewed psychological and biomedical articles related 
to the field of study. Articles and texts were selected based on degree of relevancy to (a) the 
structure and function of the DMN, (b) the impact of PTSD on the DMN, (c) the relationship 
between the DMN and social functioning, and (d) the impact of PTSD on social functioning. 
Moreover, text selection included seminal reviews that have been recognized in the field.   
Inclusion criteria for article selection were subject dependent. Literature on the DMN 
published from January 2001 through July 2014 was identified. Due to its formal introduction 
into the literature as the Default Mode by Raichle and colleagues in 2001, only a relatively small 
number of existing studies could be identified. As such, related articles within this time period 
were considered for this review. Within the research studies, subjects’ ages ranged from college 
students to a geriatric demographic, with the exception of one article that tracked the 
development of the DMN throughout the lifespan (Fair et al., 2008) 
Articles on neurobiology, PTSD, and social functioning published from January 1992 to 
July 2014 were identified. According to Huetell, Song, and McCarthy (2008), 1992 was the first 
year when studies used Blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) contrasts and comparable 
technologies, procedures, and techniques to current fMRI studies. Selected studies focused on 
experiments that used human subjects.  
The researcher employed a search strategy to identify independent and/or matched 




social functioning, and relationships as main headings or text words embedded in abstracts. 
Relevant citations from studies were also included in this review.  
In sum, 127 articles were used. Twenty-six articles were utilized to define and determine 
the structure and function of the DMN. A total of 36 research studies were identified 
investigating the impact of trauma on the resting state, 27 of which directly investigated PTSD 
and the DMN. Overall, the entire sample size consisted of an experimental group of 813 
individuals either exposed to trauma or actively diagnosed with PTSD, compared with a control 
group of 697.  Research studies particular to the DMN and PTSD resulted in an experimental 
group of 511 compared with a control group of 456.  In conjunction, 23 studies related to DMN 
functions and 18 reviews on PTSD, the brain, and self/social functioning were integrated.  An 
additional 39 supportive articles were included to provide background information on topics of 
review. Non-electronic sources included 11 published texts. 
This study will begin by operationalizing the concept of self. It will subsequently discuss 
how the DMN relates to self-functions and the impact of PTSD on these processes. Successively, 
there will be an examination of the DMN’s involvement with social processes. Methodological 
limitations will ensue, followed by a conclusion, clinical implications, and discussion/directions 




Chapter 3: The Effects of PTSD on the Default Mode Network 
Patients with PTSD are embedded in a distorted perceptual reality. Intrusions of 
unwanted memories, chaotic affective experiences, unmanageable impulses, and unpleasant 
somatic sensations all contribute to a world molded by trauma. Importantly, the manifestations of 
dysregulation go beyond visible symptoms, extending into processes of self and others. This 
phenomenon is most evident among individuals who have experienced attachment-based trauma 
as a result of chronic neglect or abuse from parents, whereby an identity forms from the 
relational patterns that have been sculpted into implicit neural networks through years of 
interactions. Biases in self and social cognition emerge, mirroring one’s relationship with one’s 
caregivers. Importantly, successive misattunements and ruptures without reconciliation may then 
lead to isolation, further exacerbating PTSD. But what of individuals who become diagnosed 
with PTSD later in life? Is it possible for traumatic experiences to become internalized and 
represented in such a way that they trump prior relational patterns, resulting in the deterioration 
of core systems that define the self? The answer to this question seems to lie in the DMN.  
The Default Mode Network and Self  
Posteromedial cortices possibly [reflect] the background-foreground dance played by the 
self within the conscious mind. When we need to attend to external stimuli, our conscious 
mind brings the object under scrutiny into the foreground and lets the self retreat into the 
background. (Damasio, 2010, p. 243) 
 
The self has long been a subject of discussion among philosophers and psychologists 
alike. Currently, the Oxford English Dictionary defines the self as “a person’s essential being 
that distinguishes them from others, especially considered as the object of introspection or 
reflexive action” (“Self,” n.d., para. 1). The father of Self Psychology, Heinz Kohut (as cited in 
Bromberg, 2014), defined self as the “independent center of initiative” (p. 3,038). Others, such as 




well as everything associated to them (i.e., house, yacht). Still some eastern philosophies 
consider the conscious self to be Maya, or an illusion (Cozolino, 2010).  
The self remains a highly controversial topic. In this review, the self will be defined as 
the sum total of conscious and non-conscious processes in an organism.  With influence from 
Kohut (as cited in Bromberg, 2014) and Wolf (Kohut & Wolf, 1978), the sense of self will be 
defined as the capacity to experience the process of existing with continuity and stability through 
time. This is an important distinction, considering that an individual’s self is very different from 
having the capacity to sense (or become aware of) that self. This study will also follow Northoff 
and Bermpohl’s (2004) conceptualization of self-functions, which is further divided into 12 




Representation Labeling of stimuli as self-referential 
Monitoring Monitoring self referential stimuli 
Evaluation Judgment of self-referential stimuli 
Integration Linkage of stimuli to the personal context 
Self-Awareness Awareness and recognition of the own face/body 
Unity Experience of self as a unit 
Agency Feeling of being causally involved in an action 
Spatial Perspectivity Location of the self in space 
Ownership Perceptions of body and environment as self-related 
Mind-Reading Covert mimicking of others mental states 
Emotion Convergence/experience of intero- and exteroceptive stimuli 
Autobiographical memory Integration of stimuli in personal context 
 
In this conceptualization, the DMN supports all of these functions (Cozolino, 2010; 
Lanius et al., 2011; Mars et al., 2012; Reniers et al., 2012; Spreng et al., 2009). As such, the 
DMN can be understood as a network that maintains an internal sense of self. The emergence of 




remember one’s past (i.e., autobiographical recall). As time passes, experiences are consolidated 
into identity (i.e., self-referential processing). Currently, it is hypothesized that self-conception is 
developed by a continuity of self-judgments relayed from observation and memory (Wagner et 
al., 2012). A natural increase in an individual’s social network inevitably leads to more complex 
relationships. Higher order socialization (i.e., empathy) evolves with development, relaying back 
in the molding of identity. Humans develop a sense of morality based on their biological 
disposition, upbringing, psychosocial experiences, and levels of societal adjustment. 
The development of a neural network dedicated to internal experience does beg the 
question, What is the evolutionary importance of having a sense of self? One hypothesis is that a 
sense of self, as reflected in the DMN, may aid in a process of differentiation and individuation 
in the context of a social environment. The evolutionary advantage of this process may be found 
in creative adaptation and the diversification of gene functioning (i.e., epigenetics). Increased 
reflective capacity may also facilitate the process of learning and enhance executive functioning 
(Taylor et al., 2012). An inability to learn from experience and engage reactively with the 
environment would likely be disadvantageous to survival. Understanding these benefits, two 
questions come to mind: (a) How does trauma impact DMN functioning? and (b) How is this 
reflected psychologically?  
PTSD has been observed among combat veterans, survivors of sexual/physical/emotional 
abuse, and victims of natural disasters, accidents (i.e., car crashes), and other medical 
complications. It would be unjust to generalize symptomology across all subtypes; however, 
commonalities in patterns of negative cognition have been observed among all these populations. 
Such cognitions include self-blame, biased or otherwise incorrect views on the causes or 




identification with an unalterable belief that they have changed for the worse. This consistent 
finding gave rise to a fourth symptom cluster, negative alterations in cognitions and mood, which 
emerged in the DSM-5. This new cluster, Criterion D, included symptoms C3-7 from the DSM-
IV-TR with two new additions: “Persistent and exaggerated negative beliefs or expectations 
about oneself, others, or the world” and “Pervasive negative emotional state” (APA, 2013, 
p. 272).  
Indeed, statements many PTSD victims endorse or report experiencing such sentiments 
as: “I am a bad person,” “Nothing good can happen to me,” and “I can never trust again” 
(Friedman, Resick, Bryant, & Brewin, 2011, p. 759): all suggestive that a core aspect of self has 
been threatened. These negative cognitions are often accompanied by emotions including fear, 
helplessness, and horror, as well as self-states of anger, guilt, and shame (Friedman et al., 2011). 
Put together, these psychological symptoms suggest that victims’ identity and continuity of self 
have been compromised.  
It comes without surprise that such pervasive spirals of negative affect and cognition are 
mirrored in neural networks. In the context of this study, symptoms of DMN dysregulation 
surface as victims develop intrusive memories, extreme sensitivity to arousal, and distortions in 
self and social processes. The disintegration of the DMN imprisons PTSD victims within the 
echoes of traumatic experience, as they are unable to escape the rigidity of a disposition that was 
once beneficial to their survival.  
 Table 2 demonstrates irregularities in resting state functioning (grouped by findings) 
correlated with PTSD. Overall, the most salient pattern is coupling between the DMN and 
Salience Network (SN), with corresponding decreases in Central Executive Network (CEN) 




among children (Suo et al., 2015). The relational connections amongst the processes of 
introspection (DMN), orientation (to environmental or internal variables, SN), and engagement 
on a particular task (CEN) are thus disrupted in PTSD, giving rise to a Traumatized Resting State 
(TRS). This merger network likely contributes to symptoms of hyperarousal, whereby 
traumatization results in an inherent focus on environmental threat detection (Tursich et al., 
2015; Zhang et al., 2015). Functionally, the emergence of a TRS may be adaptive in a dangerous 
environment, as it maintains a higher level of orientation to the detection of salience as its 
default. Increased orientation may serve a protective factor, helping individuals become more 
vigilant about their surroundings in search of potential danger. Consequently, biases in detecting 
salient variables will likely distort an individual’s self-awareness and ability to accurately 
monitor internal reactions. Perhaps this experience may have contributed to the emergence of the 
saying sleeping with one eye open.  
Table 3 
Impact of Trauma and PTSD on the Default Mode Network  
Study Demographic Findings Potential Implications 
Patel et al. 
(2012) 
Review (13 studies, PTSD on 
DMN) 
PTSD vs. Non-Trauma 
145 = PTSD  
Control = 193 
Reliable increases  
R Fusiform gyrus  
R Insula (SN) 
R Hippocampus (DMN) 
L Precuneus (CEN) 
L Amygdala (SN) 
L Putamen (SN) 
R Post-central Gyrus  
L Anterior Insula (SN) 
R Middle frontal gyrus (CEN) 
 
Reliable decreases: 
Left angular Gyrus (DMN) 
L rostral Anterior Cingulate 
L Precentral gyrus 
R Posterior Cingulate (DMN) 
R medial frontal gyrus (DMN) 
L Rostral anterior Cingulate 
R Precentral gyrus 
R Caudate (CEN) 
L Supramarginal gyrus (CEN) 
L Middle frontal gyrus (CEN) 
Increased cross talk with network dedicated 
to internal/environmental orientation SN. 
Decreases in CEN dedicated to executive 
functions. Decreases throughout DMN. 
Overall dysregulation across networks. 
Dysregulation of core self and social 
functions.  
Lei et al. 
(2015) 
76 PTSD via earthquake, 76 
trauma exposed  
 
Increased centrality of nodes predominately 
involved in DMN and SN (including PCC, 
precuneus, insula, putamen, pallidum, and 
temporal regions) 
Increased disposition towards salience 
detection. Dysregulation of core self and 
social functions. 




Study Demographic Findings Potential Implications 
Long et al. 
(2013) 
17 survivors of motor vehicle 
accidents (MVA) 
 
Enhanced nodal centralities in the SN and 
decreased centralities in the medial orbital 
frontal cortex. 
Increased vigilance, decreased self/social 
processes. 
Zhang et al. 
(2015) 
20 PTSD patients (MVA) 20 
healthy matched  
Sig decreased network connectivity in 
aDMN, pDMN SN, sensory motor network 
and auditory network, Furthermore, 
increased in SN and pDMN connectivity.  
Increased disposition towards salience 
detection. Dysregulation of core self and 
social functions.Heightened anxiety and 
hyperarousal. pDMN involved more with 
orienting self to space, emotion-memory, and 
decision making.  
Dunkley et 
al. (2015) 
21 PTSD veterans 
27 trauma exposed 
PTSD group had increased interconnectivity 
between DMN and ventral attention network 
and SN 
Increased disposition towards salience 
detection. Dysregulation of core self and 
social functions. Heightened anxiety and 
hyperarousal.   
Suo et al. 
(2015) 
28 pediatric PTSD patients 
26 trauma-exposed non-PTSD 
Enhanced nodal centralities in DMN and SN 
and reduced in CEN.  
Increased cross talk with network dedicated 
to environmental orientation SN. Decreased 
self/social and executive functioning. 
Shang et al. 
(2014)  
18 PTSD earthquake 
20 healthy survivors  
Increased and decreased functional 
connectivity within SN, DMN, CEN, 
somato-motor network (SMN), auditory 
network (AN) and visual network (VN) 
PTSD patients showed widespread deficits in 
low-level perceptual and higher-order 
cognitive network. PTSD as a complex 
network based disorder 
Chung et al. 
(2006) 
23 PTSD patients 
18 MVA 
3 DV 
2 physical assault 
64 healthy controls 
Increased cerebral blood flow in limbic 
regions and decreased blood flow in frontal 
gyrus, parietal, and temporal regions in 
comparison to the control group 
Interference from SN, lack of ability to 
inhibit, plan and organize. Engagement in 
emotional reasoning.  
Yan et al. 
(2013) 
52 Veterans diagnosed with 
PTSD 
52 control group veterans 
Increased spontaneous activity in amygdala, 
ventral anterior cingulate cortex, insula and 
orbital frontal cortex, decreased activity in 
precuneus, DLPFC, and thalamus 
Failure of frontal inhibition of amygdala. 
Intrusion of SN into DMN. Increased 
disposition towards salience detection. 
decreased capacity for self/social processes 
Jin et al. 
(2014) 
72 PTSD earthquake 
86 Trauma exposed non-PTSD 
Weaker positive connectivity between mPFC 
and amygdala, hippocampus, 
parahippocampal gyrus and rectus. As well 
as inferior OFC and hippocampus. PTSD 
patients also show stronger negative 
connectivity between PCC and insula.  
CAPS scores in PTSD patients had a 
negative correlation with connectivity 
between amygdala and mPFC.  
Failure of frontal inhibition of amygdala. 
Intrusion of SN into DMN. Increased 
disposition towards salience detection. 
decreased capacity for self/social processes 
Sripada et al. 
(2012) 
15 returning male veterans 
diagnosed with PTSD 
14 combat controls  
Positive connectivity between amygdala and 
insula. Reduced connectivity between the 
amygdala and hippocampus. 
 
Anti-correlation between the amygdala and 
dorsal/rostral areas of the ACC. 
Dissociation between intensely feared 
memories and the ability for 
autobiographical memory to contextualize 
and regulate them.  
May contribute to flashbacks and an inability 
to control undesirable memories. 
  Less activation and coherence in overall 
DMN and an increase in the activation of the 
SN.  
Impairment in logical thinking in arousing 
situations. Errors and rewards may be 
overlooked due to the irregularities of their 
emotional responses 
  Increased cross-network connectivity 
between the DMN and SN. 
Increased disposition towards salience 
detection. decreased capacity for self/social 
processes. 
Lui et al. 
(2009) 
44 survivors natural disaster 
(earthquake 8.0) 
32 control 
Acute - 25 days post 
 
Decreased DMN integration, reduced 
temporal synchronization. Functional 
disconnections among the limbic-striatal and 
DMN. Hyperactivity in prefrontal-limbic and 
striatal brain systems and pre-supplementary 
motor area 
Biases in episodic memory, emotional 
processing, decision-making.  




Study Demographic Findings Potential Implications 
Bonne et al. 
(2003)  
28 civilian trauma (most 
MVA) survivors (11 with 
PTSD)  
Acute 6 months after trauma 
PTSD : Regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) 
higher in cerebellum and right precentral, 
superior temporal and fusiform gyrus.   
Cerebellar and extrastriate rCBF positive 
correlate with depression and PTSD 
symptoms. 
Cortisol level in PTSD negative correlation 
with medial temporal lobe perfusion. 
ACC perfusion and cortisol positively related 
to PTSD but negative in trauma survivors 
w/o PTSD.  
Focus on survival and increased intrusions of 
SN, threat detection. Increased detection for 
error correction resulting in cortisol spike in 
PTSD sample.  
Kemp et al. 
(2010)  
14 victims of PTSD  
15 individuals with Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) 
15 healthy  
Positive correlation between PTSD severity 
and right-frontal lateralization. Greater 
activity in PTSD vs. MDD in right-
parietotemporal regions 
Emotionality and difficulties with self-
regulation 
DiGangi et 
al. (2016)  
Combat victims 22 veterans 
with PTSD 
18 Combat Exposure 
13 Control Group (healthy 
civilian) 
Both PTSD and trauma exposed samples 
exhibited weaker connectivity within a 
network involving the precuneus, medial 
prefrontal cortex and right superior parietal 
lobule.  
Biases in self-referential processes and 
mental strategies related to self, reduced 
episodic memory retrieval  
 
Lanius et al. 
(2010) 
11 subjects MVA 
Acute trauma 6-12 weeks 
PTSD symptoms associated with 
connectivity of PCC/precuneus with 
perigenual ACC and right amygdala.  
DMN connectivity was predictive of future 
PTSD symptoms. Merger of SN into self-
processes Right amygdala shift. 
Zhou et al. 
(2012) 
15 PTSD victims MVA 
Acute 2 days post fMRI all 
developed PTSD 
PCC negatively correlated with CAPS 
(Clinician Administered PTSD Scale) scores 
in right hippocampus, right amygdala and 
left superior temporal gyrus,. Strength of 
connectivity between PCC and bilateral 
amygdala, and even between bilateral 
amygdala predicts severity of PTSD 
symptoms  
  
DMN connectivity predictive of future PTSD 
Symptoms.  Right amygdala shift. 
Bluhm et al. 
(2009) 
17 female victims of PTSD 
(Chronic early-life trauma) 
and 15 healthy controls.  
Reduced functional connectivity of PCC 
with precuneus, mPFC and bilateral parietal 
cortex in PTSD relative to controls 
Disturbances in self-referential processing, 
and social cognition. 
Qin et al. 
(2012)  
62 victims of motor vehicle 
accidents with PTSD (22 
victims dx with PTSD)  
19 control group - Acute 2- 
days post traumatic incident 
 
Trauma: decreased functional connectivity in 
right lingual and right middle temporal gyri 
and PCC. Decreased PCC and mPFC 
connectivity predictive of higher CAPS 
scores 
 
Increases in right middle temporal gyrus, 
insula, right medial frontal gyrus and left 
ACC and left inferior temporal gyrus,  
Disturbances in self-referential processing, 
increased emotional dysregulation, reduced 
interoception. 
Zhang et al. 
(2011) 
10 Natural disaster victims 
with PTSD, 10 without 
Reduced left hippocampal volume  Decreased capacity for consolidation, and 
hippocampus to regulate limbic activity. 
Kim et al. 
(2012) 
12 Sexual assault victims with 
PTSD 
Reduced left hippocampal perfusion and 
activity 
Decreased capacity for a victim of PTSD to 
remember details of a trauma 
Bremner et 
al. (1997) 
17 Survivors of child abuse, 
17 healthy subjects 
12% smaller left hippocampal volume  
Bing et al.  
(2013) 
20 PTSD (MVA) 
20 controls 
Reduction volume of anterior PFC, inferior 
frontal gyrus, dorsal ACC, and right superior 
temporal gyrus in PTSD.  
Decreased volume and increased amplitude 
low frequency fluctuations in aPFC, and 
dACC were associated with PTSD severity 
    
  Decrease in dorsolateral prefrontal cortical 
(dlPFC) activations 
Inability to inhibit unwanted memories 
  Increased activation in the right anterior 
insula 
Poor interoception and processing of 
negative emotions. 
  Positive connectivity between the insula and 
amygdala 
Fight/flight bodily responses in an 
environment that no longer requires such 
adaptive measures. 




Study Demographic Findings Potential Implications 
Yin et al. 
(2011) 
72 PTSD diagnosis 
86 Non-PTSD 
EQ 8 months into event 
Right hemisphere lateralization Alterations in emotions and processing and 
integration of trauma recall 
Decreases in right insula, visual cortex, 
cerebellum 
Aberrant encoding retrieval of episodic 
memory and complex verbal working 
memory. 
Overactivation in right frontal regions. 
Ventral mPFC, DLPFC.  
Depression, anxiety autonomic arousal 
Tursich et al. 
(2015) 
21 victims dx with PTSD 
(childhood trauma) 
Decreased connectivity left posterior insula 
and superior temporal gyrus within SN. 
 
Reduced connectivity in DMN (perigenual 
anterior cingulate and vmPFC). Reduced 
synchrony between dorsal anterior and 
posterior DMN components and between 
right CEN and ventral anterior DMN 
 
 




Daniels et al. 
(2010) 
12 individuals with severe, 
chronic PTSD and 12 controls 
During working memory task, enhanced 
connectivity between the PCC and right 
superior frontal gyrus, as well as between the 
mPFC and left parahippocampal gyrus. 
Failure to deactivate associated DMN 
regions when attempting to engage in a 
working memory task, resulting in reduced 
attentional lapses and decrements in 
performance 
Du et al. 
(2015)  
21 survivors of earthquake, 21 
healthy controls 
3 weeks post-disaster: frontal-limbic-striatal 
and DMN had functional connectivity 
changes. 2 year follow-up only changes in 
DMN persisted despite recovery from high 
initial levels of anxiety  
Long-term changes occur in core aspects of 
self-processing, cognitive and emotional 
functioning – independent of anxiety sx. 
Increase risk of PTSD development  
 
 Unfortunately, this hypervigilance becomes maladaptive in a safe environment. 
Generalization of salience detection likely raises the probability of fear-based responses in any 
situation that presents with ambiguity. Similar to the perceptual filling of the blind spot caused 
by the optic nerve, the brain’s adaptive nature provides biased, survival-based responses that are 
inherently resistant to change. The result is an inability to remain calm in the presence of 
misinformed anticipated danger. This sense of impending doom prevents victims of PTSD from 
feeling safe enough to engage in accurate self-based processes that may very well help them to 
re-stabilize their DMN.   
 Interestingly, PTSD victims experience contradictory signals to focus on the environment 
during moments of introspection, with this process being reversed during moments requiring full 
engagement with the environment. Daniels and colleagues (2010) conducted an experiment with 
12 individuals with severe, chronic PTSD and 12 controls, finding that individuals with PTSD 




the mPFC and left parahippocampal gyrus. Individuals with PTSD consistently failed to 
deactivate these associated DMN regions when attempting to engage in a working memory task, 
resulting in reduced cognitive performance. Furthermore, they reviewed three additional studies, 
all of which supported their conclusions, demonstrating that the inability to deactivate the DMN 
during tasks led to “decreased activity in task-related regions, attentional lapses and decrements 
in performance” (p. 264). In sum, the SN interferes with DMN functioning during moments of 
reflection, while the DMN becomes the source of interference during moments requiring the 
CEN.  
In extension, a review of Table 3 demonstrates reductions in connectivity between frontal 
systems and the amygdala (a central subcortical structure part of the SN). This is compounded by 
hypoactive activity in frontal regions and hyperactive limbic activity, with a consequent decline 
in CEN functioning. This finding is consistent with the overall neuropsychological profile of 
PTSD victims. Vasterling and Brailey (2005) noted that:  
Cognitive deficits are not global but are limited to specific domains, in particular 
attention and memory functions. Within these domains aspects of attention and memory 
dependent on executive controls (inhibition, working memory, initial acquisition, 
freedom from sensitivity to distraction and interference) appear to be especially 
vulnerable in PTSD. (p. 199) 
 
Of note, the orbitofrontal cortex is highly sensitive to abnormalities in the serotonergic and 
noradrenergic neurotransmitter systems. Cognitive impairment observed in emotionally neutral 
tasks in PTSD is thought to be associated with these former systems, which are highly involved 
in regulation of arousal, as it is richly connected to both the amygdala and hippocampus 
(Vasterling & Brailey, 2005).  
 It is interesting to note one study (Zhang et al., 2015) that specified increases in 




posterior DMN involves regions associated with orienting oneself in space, emotion-memory, 
and decision-making (Kilpatrick et al., 2015). This is a logical conclusion, given that the 
demographic was composed of motor vehicle accident (MVA) victims. Hypervigilance seems to 
have emerged in alignment with the specific trauma, perhaps the brain’s best defense in 
preventing another accident. 
 In sum, when affected individuals are in a resting state, they maintain a focus on potential 
threats, and when attempting to focus on a task, they are unable to inhibit self-states reflective of 
threat-detection, negative cognition, and emotionality. Psychologically, this implies the 
preservation of a rigid and active defense mechanism that was adaptive during threatening 
situations, yet is no longer applicable. Importantly, this manifestation is partially accounted for 
and maintained by impairments in cognition. Conflicting signals between self-environment 
interactions may further lead to isolation and cognitive dissonance, where thoughts, feelings, and 
actions lead to incongruous states of being, ending with a loss of agency.  
A third pattern concerns disruptions in DMN regions highly related to self-referential 
processing (SRP). Neuroanatomically, this includes reductions in mPFC and PCC connectivity 
and activation. SRP can include both explicit and implicit evaluations of oneself, or oneself in 
relation to other people. Johnson and colleagues (2002) defined SRP as “A collection of 
schemata regarding one’s abilities, traits and attitudes that guides our behaviors, choices and 
social interactions” (p. 1,808).   
Victims of PTSD often experience negatively biased SRP. Bluhm and colleagues (2012) 
were curious about differences between SRP in PTSD victims (n = 20) and a control group 
(n = 15).  During an fMRI scan, individuals were asked to respond to yes or no statements 




6 feet tall”), and general facts (i.e., “Paris is the capital of France,” p. 240). Not only did the 
PTSD group endorse more statements like “I feel like an object, not like a person,” or “I feel 
isolated and set apart from others” (p. 243), but they also did not experience any advantage when 
responding to questions about themselves, responding with similar reaction times to general 
facts. This study replicated findings by Johnson and colleagues (2002) and contributed to the 
growing number of studies supporting the role of the mPFC and PCC in self-referential 
processing. More specifically, their results also indicate diminished mPFC response during the 
SRP exercise in PTSD patients relative to healthy individuals.  
As mentioned previously, the mPFC is a node in the DMN and a convergence zone 
involved with the self-process of integration. Dysfunctions in dmPFC functioning may impact 
self-related cognitions and embodied self-awareness, whereas dysfunctions in vmPFC may result 
in distortions in impressions of others and conceptual self-awareness (dmPFC). The associations 
of these functions are curious in their own right. Together with increases in insular-limbic 
connections, victims of PTSD may develop an inherent dysregulation of self and others, 
compounded by distrust of emotional and somatic experiences that facilitate the guidance of 
actions. Not only may irregular activations potentially lead to aberrant decision-making, but they 
may also be linked to the high levels of alexithymia (challenges identifying emotional states) 
often found among PTSD victims (Lanius et al., 2011). 
Along with poor representation, evaluation, and awareness, other common symptoms 
include emotional numbing and affective disturbances such as fear, anger, guilt, and shame. It is 
conceivable that disjointed self-processes and fragmented memory (e.g., flashbacks, inability to 




foundations of one’s sense of self. Identity becomes distorted as SRPs become increasingly 
negative, promoting a cycle of maladaptive patterns.  
Bromberg (2001) asserted that “Self reflectiveness…allows a patient fully to exist in the 
moment and simultaneously perceive the self that is existing. The ability of the human mind to 
adaptationally limit its self-reflective capacity is the hallmark of dissociation” (p. 231). 
Diminishment of self-reflective capacity leads to reactive states, potentially leading to difficulties 
in coping and maladaptive behaviors (i.e., violent outbursts, irritability). In relation, Tursich and 
colleagues (2015) were curious about how DMN dysregulation related to symptoms of trauma 
relative to other networks. They found that reduced DMN functioning was associated with 
dissociative symptoms such as derealization and depersonalization, whereas SN activity was 
related to symptoms of hyperarousal. Of interest, reduced synchrony was found between the 
dorsal anterior DMN (greater involvement in self processing) and posterior DMN (greater 
involvement in social processing). Moreover, disequilibrium between the CEN and DMN has 
been associated with unaware mind-wandering (Christoff et al., 2009). Together, the emergence 
depersonalization or derealization seems very conceivable. This is consistent with Du and 
colleagues’ (2015) encounter of long-term DMN incoherence, despite resolution of anxiety 
symptoms (which may be more a reflection of increased SN activity). It may be possible that 
dissociative symptoms are more resilient to change, as depersonalization is currently understood 
as a result of severe recurrent anxiety with no potential expression (Cozolino, 2014). Indeed, 
treatments for depersonalization and derealization have not been very effective. Perhaps the 
aforementioned symptoms are at their core an internetwork dysregulation. 
 A review by Bremner, Elzinga, Schmahl, and Vermetten (2007) noted that the most 




volumes in the mPFC, anterior cingulate, and hippocampus (areas related to DMN). The 
reductions found in volumetric studies often imply a decreased capacity in associated functions. 
This study encountered right hemispheric lateralization with consistent reductions in left 
hippocampal volume and activity. The right hemisphere has been associated with bodily and 
non-verbal based experiences (Cozolino, 2010), and left hippocampal regions have been 
associated with context-dependent episodic or autobiographical memory (Zhang et al., 2011).  In 
this light, right-hemisphere amygdala biased networks overwhelm left-hemispheric cortical-
hippocampal networks, merging terror and fear into discriminatory and self-processes. Indeed, 
from a fear-conditioning model, “Extreme sympathetic arousal at the time of a traumatic event 
may result in the release of stress neurochemicals (including norepinephrine and epinephrine), 
mediating an overconsolidation of trauma memories” (Bryant, 2011, p. 254). Clinically, this 
correlation makes it a significant challenge for individuals to access left hemispheric biased 
hippocampal networks to regulate the overlearned trauma embedded in amygdala/right 
hemispheric biased networks (Cozolino, 2010). This process enables vague emotions to override 
logical decision-making, resulting in distorted emotional reasoning.  
 It seems that the most striking way PTSD affects autobiographical recall is through the 
experience of intrusions, consequently destabilizing one’s sense of agency and autonomy; 
however, there are also more subtle ways to detect impairment in autobiographical recall. In two 
studies, Moradi and colleagues (2008) found that refugees with PTSD had a reduced capacity to 
provide specific details from memories on an autobiographical memory test. In their other 
experiment, trauma-exposed cancer survivors were found to generate fewer specific semantic 
autobiographical details compared to controls. A negative correlation was found between 




distortions, in particular overgeneralizations, or the magnification of certain details at the 
expense of others. This bias may result in the skewing of facts, further reinforcing the fourth 
cluster of PTSD: negative mood and cognitions (APA, 2013). Lack of detail in autobiographical 
recall, misaligned intuitive responses, and the objectification of self may promulgate a cycle of 
negativity.  Operating from this disposition, negativity becomes projected in social engagement, 
resulting in internal and external strife. Frequent failures in attunement spiral into dissociation 
and numbing, as the sense of self recedes into the background.    
Final important details that may shed some light on PTSD are studies investigating the 
impact of trauma on the DMN in comparison to PTSD on the DMN. It is interesting to note that 
DiGangi and colleagues (2016) found reduced DMN connectivity (mPFC, precuneus, and right 
superior parietal lobule) in both samples of 22 veterans exposed to combat trauma with PTSD 
and 18 without PTSD. They concluded that trauma exposure, rather than the pathology of PTSD, 
may be related to DMN changes. Unfortunately, the authors did not examine what functional 
changes resulted from reduced DMN connectivity due to traumatic exposure. In support, six 
studies support changes in the DMN in acute traumatized victims (Bonne et al., 2003; Du et al., 
2015; Lanius et al., 2010; Lui et al., 2009; Qin et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2012). Of curiosity, 
DMN dysregulation also appears to be the most resistant to recovery in PTSD, demonstrating 
continual reductions 2 years post-trauma in spite of other networks recovering (Du et al., 2015).  
It may be that the initial rush of norepinephrine and epinephrine resulting from a traumatic event 
facilitates an overconsolidation of the trauma. The resultant reductions in DMN activity, may 
then limit self and social functioning in service of survival (Du et al., 2015). This neural event 
may then predispose an individual to acquire PTSD. In fact, studies have found that levels of 




developing PTSD (Lanius et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2012). These are critical findings warrant 
further research, as they suggest potential symptomology that extends beyond visible symptoms.  
With an understanding that simple exposure to a traumatic event can disrupt DMN 
functioning, it becomes logical to ask: Does exposure to trauma and the experiences leading to 
the development of PTSD alter DMN functioning in different ways? In the context of a temporal 
trajectory, it was interesting to note that despite the etiology of PTSD and timing in acute 
traumatized victims, findings seem to be fluidly connected across studies. Two studies examined 
the DMN just 2 days post MVA traumatic experience (Qin et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2012), 
together of these studies encountered decreases in connectivity between the PCC and mPFC (Qin 
et al., 2012), PCC-bilateral amygdala, and left-right amygdala, which were additionally 
predictive of increased severity of PTSD symptology. Consistent findings were encountered just 
3 weeks post-trauma as a result of an earthquake (Du et al., 2015), with complete functional 
connectivity changes in frontal-limbic-striatal and DMN networks. Surprisingly, 6-12 weeks post 
MVA trauma, findings were significant for increased right amygdala connectivity with 
PCC/Precuneus (Lanius et al., 2010). Six months post-trauma (MVA), Bonne and colleagues 
(2003) found continued increased blood flow to regions related to threat detection, facial 
expressions, and motor movements. 8 months post-earthquake with PTSD, individuals 
demonstrate reduced mPFC and limbic connectivity (amygdala and hippocampus), which was 
also negatively correlated to symptom severity. PCC and insula were also negatively correlated 
(Jin et al., 2014). Twenty-five days and 2 years post-trauma, reductions in DMN coherence 
continue, in spite of other networks recovering (Du et al., 2015).   In extension, two cross-
sectional studies discovered reductions in grey matter volume in regions of the DMN (insula, 




viewing fearful faces (Ganzel, Casey, Glover, Voss, & Temple, 2007). As such, there seems to 
be underlying neurobiological mechanisms giving rise to PTSD, with the DMN playing a core 
role.  
 Notably, there is convergence within the neuroanatomical findings regardless of the 
etiology of PTSD. There was one set of conflicting findings concerning increased (Yan et al., 
2013) and decreased (Yin et al., 2011) right insular activation. Yin and colleagues (2011) 
examined survivors of an 8.0 magnitude earthquake in Sichuan 8 months following the natural 
disaster. Yan et al. (2013) examined U.S. veterans who served in Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan and/or Operation Iraqi Freedom. Interestingly, Lui and colleagues (2009) examined 
individuals 25 days following the Wenchuan earthquake of the same magnitude (8.0), and found 
increases in bilateral insular activation. 
 These deviations may reflect inherent differences in methodology, as well as potential 
differences in the developmental trajectory of PTSD for different ethnicities. Another potential 
explanation lies in understanding that the insula is related to interoception and somatic 
experiences. Culturally, Asian ethnicities have a higher tendency to somaticize psychological 
distress (Sue & Sue, 2008). It would be interesting if this cultural disposition presented itself 
through DMN dysregulation and whether it unfolds differently over time. In the same context, 
there exist instances of delayed-onset PTSD, in particular among individuals who have sustained 
a traumatic brain injury. In this vein, despite an amnestic state during an accident, the 
reconstruction of memories may result in PTSD in and of itself (Bryant, 2011). This process of 
reconstruction may also influence the course of DMN functioning. 
 The DSM-5 categorizes symptoms in such a way that makes it more amenable to 




method is that by creating independent constructs, it becomes easy to lose sight of how these 
symptoms really manifest together as a whole.  This notion is played out in the TRS, which 
appears to play a role in symptoms of hyperarousal, avoidance, intrusions, negative mood and 
cognitions, and potentially beyond. Negative valences associated with self and social processes 
are defined by DMN connectivity with the limbic system. These conflicts are compounded by 
inefficient network transitions, manifesting in poorer executive functioning, attention, and 
working memory. Network abnormalities lead to social difficulties, leading to avoidance-based 
symptoms, as increased disinhibition results in a loss of control and ultimately a fragmentation of 
self. 
From a conceptual perspective, PTSD occurring in adulthood seems to work on core 
systems of the self from general to specific, or from the outside in. More specifically, in 
attachment, individuals develop internal working models that generalize to their experiences of 
strangers. Thus, an individual who was securely attached will likely see the world as a safe place 
where he/she can take risks without experiencing internal conflict, if this risk were to result in 
failure. However, traumatic exposure, (e.g., with veterans being subjected to as well as 
perpetrating violence) may result in one’s sense of relational safety and trust becoming obsolete, 
as traumatic experiences become internalized into a representation of the world characterized by 
distrust, shame, and guilt.  
Fragmentation of Time  
Perhaps one fundamental aspect of a sense of self that Northoff and Bermpohl’s (2004) 
list did not include is temporal perceptivity. Autobiographical recall, prospection, self-reflection, 
and social cognition all use degrees of mental time travel. Certainly, the DMN’s association with 




sense of a continuous self relies on a stable perception and experience of time. This phenomenon 
begs the question, Does PTSD impact one’s sense of time? Are there traits that may express this 
distortion of time in victims of PTSD?  
Literature has supported associations between impulsivity and a distorted sense of time 
(Berlin, Rolls, & Kischka, 2004; Rubia, Halari, Christakou, & Taylor, 2009; Wittman, Leland, 
Churan, & Paulus, 2007). A study by Wittman and colleagues (2011) found that cognitive time 
management was related to activations in the inferior frontal and medial frontal cortices, the 
anterior insula, as well as the inferior parietal cortex: components of the DMN. In relation, 
Heinz, Makin-Byrd, Blonigen, Reilly, and Timko (2015) found an association between PTSD 
symptom severity and aggressive behavior. In fact, they found impulsivity to be “a key mediator 
between trauma symptoms and aggressive behavior” (p. 59).  
 Wittman et al. (2011) defined impulsivity as “a pattern of unplanned actions without 
regard for the negative consequences that might follow” (p. 44). They further elaborated that 
temporal distortions are present in highly impulsive individuals. One example of this correlation 
is fallibility in overestimating the costs of suspending time. This deficit results in untimely 
reactions, a diminished capacity to endure intervals of time, and poor prospection. Ultimately, 
impulsivity is associated with high levels of a present orientation and a reduced ability to think in 
the future. More directly, the authors also suggested that several studies have shown impulsive 
individuals to overestimate and under-produce time intervals. Neurobiologically, the authors 
found increasing activation in the posterior insula during the encoding phase of their experiment. 
Moreover, they found that levels of activation in motor execution regions were correlated with 
impulsivity and behavioral performance. One theory related to this phenomenon is that the 




cognitive processing (Eagleman & Pariyadath, 2009). Others have proposed that the inherent 
features of time perception are intimately tied to memory (Staddon, 2005; Wackermann & Ehm, 
2006).  
 In relation to impulsivity in PTSD, one finds higher activations in the insula and denser 
connections with the limbic system. Deficits in the tolerance of impulse and affect are well 
known traits of individuals afflicted with PTSD. This deficiency may be further exacerbated by 
cognitive misalignments of time estimations as well as a decreased capacity to hold potential 
benefits in mind for long enough due to working memory, attention, and executive-based deficits 
(Vasterling & Brailey, 2005).  
 The inability to delay gratification as a result of lack of impulse control relates to the 
earlier discussion of the developmental trajectory of 7-9 year olds. Irritability, reckless and self-
destructive behavior, and angry outbursts are all related to, if not inclusive of, impulsivity. 
Indeed, Briere and Spinazzola (2005) understood these difficulties as “self-capacities,” further 
defining them as “dysfunction[s] in one’s abilities to regulate one’s internal experience and one’s 
interaction with others,” with dysfunctional behaviors resulting from this domain, including: 
“suicidality, impulse control, substance abuse and tension reduction behaviors” (p. 402). 
 Holeman (1996) suggested that individuals with PTSD experience temporal 
disintegration, or “a process in which the present moment becomes isolated from the continuity 
of past and future time” (p. xi). From this vantage point, intrusions and triggering experiences 
can be seen as an inability to separate past experiences from the present. In support of Holeman’s 
hypothesis, Holocaust survivors frequently, albeit anecdotally, reported feeling disoriented in 
relation to their experience of the past and present. The natural trajectory of temporal integration 




Wittman and colleagues’ study (2011), the present becomes cognitively misattuned to and 
temporally understood out of context. In this light, the stability and continuity of self becomes 
threatened. In reviewing several studies, Wittman et al. concluded that “individuals become 
cognitively and emotionally ‘stuck’ in their prior traumatic experiences, and are likely to 
experience elevated levels of distress once it has passed” (p. 83), suggesting that “severity 
predicts the immediate response, which, in turn, is associated with the degree of past orientation 
and distress” (p. 84). 
From a neurobiological perspective, reductions in precuneal activity in PTSD victims 
(Yan et al., 2013) may be related. The precuneus has been found to play a role in self-related 
mental representations and the integration of past and present information. In this context, 
decreased precuneal activity may be reducing an individual’s access to internal resources, 
hindering flexibility and the ability to relate memories to the present context.  
Victims of severe PTSD are dominated by past traumatic experiences and the threat of a 
biased imagined future, losing grasp of the present. Cognitive and emotional distortions in time 
promulgate decision-making that is not based in reality.  The ruptured integrity of temporal 
experience directly impacts the continuity and stability of self. Confusion and limited 
metacognitive capacity lead to impulsivity, impacting relationships negatively. Self-awareness 
and identity become negatively biased, as the mPFC, PCC, and limbic relationships are adapted 
to a reality that has passed. Subjective distress is maintained and victims are unable to switch off 
the SN during times of self-reflection. Moreover, as they engage with the environment, they are 
unable to inhibit their negative cycles of self. How is it, then, that dysregulated DMN activity 
may lead to social impairment? Do these negative cycles get projected into the environment, or 




The DMN and Social Processes 
The relationship between the DMN and social cognition is well documented (Laird et al., 
2011; Schilbach, Eickhoff, Rotarska-Jagiela, Fink, & Vogeley, 2008). The importance of social 
cognitive processes is endless. They mediate attachment processes between the parent-child 
dynamic, promote human survival through communal living and socializing, and serve as a 
baseline for people to reason morally and act with beneficence. The necessity to track the 
complexity of our ever growing and changing social networks has become vital. The trajectory 
of human brain development has been suggestive of these adaptations, and can be characterized 
by its tendency to differentiate with increasing complexity. From the perspective of social 
neuroscience, scholars propose that the act of observing and imagining another person in a 
particular emotional state leads to an automatic reproduction of that state as it is neurally 
represented in the observer, thus resulting in what is called a shared neural representation 
(Singer & Lamm, 2009). Table 4 includes four social cognitive functions that Nietlisbach & 
Maercker (2009) consider to be important for successful social interactions. Saxe’s (2006) notion 
of Representational ToM was included to provide further specificity and accuracy.  
Table 4 
Social Cognitive Functions 
Social Cognition Description 
Theory of Mind (ToM; Nietlisbach & 
Maercker, 2009) 
Representational ToM (Saxe, 2006)  
Cognitive; Recognizing that another has a mind and 
accurately assuming what that mental state is 
How a mental state is represented in the other 
Empathy (Nietlisbach & Maercker, 
2009) 
Affective; shared emotional state via observation and 
imagination  
Emotional Resonance (Nietlisbach & 
Maercker, 2009) 
Non-conscious, implicit, affective resonance via non-
verbal cues, social signals  
Perception of social exclusion 
(Nietlisbach & Maercker, 2009) 






Notably, Saxe’s (2006) review found that ToM and representational ToM could be 
understood as developmental phases2 in social cognition. Saxe suggested that evidence 
converges on the right TPJ as an area selectively associated with higher levels of ToM. She 
additionally pointed out that the PCC and medial frontal regions are recruited for overall social 
cognition, with the vmPFC being activated in tasks of empathy and volumetric grey matter 
corresponding to net social connections and mentalizing (Lewis et al., as cited in Saxe, 2006). 
Evidently, all the aforementioned regions are part of the DMN.  
A study by Nazarov and colleagues (2014) demonstrated deficits in ToM in 51 women 
diagnosed with PTSD due to childhood abuse. The study involved two tasks. One task was the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Revised (RMET), a computer based task commonly used in 
ToM investigations. Put simply, the program presents cropped photographs of eyes and the 
surrounding facial region. Participants are required to decipher what individuals may be feeling 
or thinking by choosing one in four adjectives post-presentation. Reaction times and accuracy of 
scores are recorded. In this experiment, PTSD victims were slower at deducting complex mental 
states from emotionally salient facial expressions in comparison to healthy women.  
In the second task, subjects were given the Interpersonal Perception Task-15 (IPT-15). 
They were shown 15 1-minute videos of social interactions and then asked questions (multiple 
choice) regarding the particular interaction that had occurred in the videos. In this task a 
significant correlation was found between ToM performance, dissociation, and depressive 
symptoms, with increases in the aforementioned symptoms strongly associated with decreased 
accuracy in identification and a distorted understanding of kinship interactions. Depressive 
symptoms were related to decrements in identifying negative and positive mental states, whereas 
                                                




dissociative symptoms were related to reduced capacity to identify positive and neutral mental 
states. Notably, the authors emphasized that these poorer performances were related to higher 
levels of disengagement, memory disturbance, and identity dissociation.  Indeed, women who 
have been abused tend to perceive family environments as less cohesive and experience greater 
challenges in marital functioning and attachment in adult relationships (Nazarov et al., 2014). 
These experiences may culminate in the perception of social exclusion, further promoting the 
cycle of PTSD.  
These challenges in relationships extend across other victims of PTSD generalizing into 
different environments. PTSD has been found to increase one’s risk of unemployment by 150% 
and marital instability by 60% (Galovsky & Lyons, 2004). In one study (Riggs, Byrne, Weathers, 
& Litz, 1998), 70% of veterans with significant others reported relationship distress, as opposed 
to 30% of veterans who were not diagnosed with PTSD. The severity of PTSD was also found to 
have a direct correlation to the levels of distress reported.  More specifically, victims of PTSD 
encountered challenges with intimacy, leading to the process of separation and divorce. One of 
PTSD’s major contributors to relational challenges is numbing (MacDonald, Chamberlain, Long, 
& Flett, 1999; Ray & Vanstone, 2009). Emotional expression plays a profound role in relational 
quality. Restricted disclosure, communication challenges, and affective blunting propagate 
ambiguity, leading to reduced trust, marital disarray, and detachment (Riggs et al., 1998).  In 
addition to marital discord, parenting has also been documented as an issue among individuals 
diagnosed with PTSD. Harkness (1993) described reports of veterans’ parenting to be 
controlling, overprotective, and demanding. In line with these findings, it was estimated that four 
out of five veteran families centered their lives around the veterans’ irritability, aggressiveness, 




These relational challenges are likely influenced by task-switching rigidity and enhanced 
connectivity to the SN. Two other functions that have been associated with DMN activity are the 
perception of facial expressions and processing of social relationships (Cozolino, 2014). As 
suggested by Nietlisbach and Maercker (2009), PTSD victims likely interpret social signals 
inaccurately and as a result base their actions on biased attempts at mind-reading. The perception 
of accurate social interactions requires the integration of non-verbal cues while assuming the 
perspectives of others. Such misalignments in interpretation will inevitably result in a reduced 
the capacity for emotional resonance and potential perceptions of social exclusion. Deficits in 
ToM and emotional resonance will consequently interrupt the capacity to experience a shared 
emotional state (empathy). In this context, it is not surprising that PTSD has been found to 
negatively impact self-awareness, intimacy, sexuality, and communication, all of which are 
fundamental in maintaining healthy interpersonal relationships.  
Flexibility and accuracy in social cognition are contingent upon the quality of internal 
development, as well as the capacity for self-reflection (Lanius et al., 2011). Imagined 
interactions—whether future, present, or past—are rooted in their necessity to utilize mental 
representations from autobiographical memory (Spreng et al., 2009). The use of autobiographical 
memory in social cognition highlights the DMN as a strategic system that is used in social 
processes, such as empathy (Mars et al., 2012). These important foundational and functional 
relationships help explain the shared use of the DMN for both self and social processes. 
Similarly, self-referential processing has been intimately tied to mentalizing. Mentalizing 
is “a form of mostly preconscious imaginative mental activity, namely perceiving and 
interpreting human behavior in terms of intentional mental states (e.g., needs, desires, feelings, 




PCC, TPJ, and medial frontal cortex have all been associated with the ability to understand and 
attribute mental states of others (Mars et al., 2012). The DMN’s relationship with areas involved 
in ToM and mentalizing was further supported by Schilbach and colleagues (2008), who 
similarly noted their shared circuitry as a salient feature. They found that both involved the 
precuneus, left angular gyrus, and ACC. These areas are involved with social interactions, 
differentiating self and others, and action monitoring in self and others, respectively. The authors 
suggested that the DMN primes an individual for social cognition.  
It is interesting to note that reduced activation in the mPFC can result in the experience of 
what Fonagy has termed disruptive impulsion, or uncontained unmentalized experiences, often 
characterized as an unstoppable urge to do something (Allen et al., 2008). This description is 
reflective of the impulsivity often observed in victims of PTSD (Heinz et al., 2015). 
Jack and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that social tasks consistently activated areas of 
the DMN while inhibiting areas activated during mechanical reasoning (i.e., dorsal parietal and 
lateral prefrontal cortices, both members of a TPN). This finding supports the hypothesis that 
human brains appear to be neurally bound to one cognitive mode at a time. The DMN thus plays 
a role in figure-ground perception, temporarily suppressing analytical thinking in order to 
promote reflection upon self and socially-related processes or suppressing such processes in 
order to focus on environmental demands. They hypothesized two possibilities of this 
relationship:  
1. It may serve to increase the effectiveness of predicting future behavior. There would 
be more room for error if the system used for predicting an inanimate object were 




would begin firing if it felt threatened, or conversely that individuals are just things, 
objects that can be destroyed without any consequence. 
2. Another possibility, for which the authors show preference, is the need to distinguish 
between conscious moral entities and non-conscious inanimate objects. Limitations 
and sensitivity are required with human beings, whereas applying these same rules 
with inanimate objects would simply not make sense.  
These arguments are very interesting from the vantage point of trauma. The TRS formed from 
the merger of the DMN and SN, with reductions in CEN functioning, disrupts fluid transitions 
from reflective/social states to task oriented states (mechanical reasoning) and vice-versa 
(Daniels et al., 2010). Interference within DMN-SN-CEN functioning during different contexts is 
likely mirrored by the blending of different cognitive modes. Indeed, it is common for victims of 
PTSD to endorse statements like “I feel like an object, not like a person” (Bluhm et al., 2012).  
Given the overlapping mapping of social and self-processes, it is likely that an objectification of 
self may further generalize into an objectification of others. Understandably, this may have 
served an adaptive function during war, where empathic attunement with enemies would 
undoubtedly be maladaptive. Life-threatening circumstances necessitate individuals to think 
more mechanically, rather than sensitively.  This may help explain why violence and 
interpersonal challenges are so common with victims of PTSD. An overconsolidated and 
generalized psychological reaction to a dangerous environment may drastically increase the 
chances of insensitive behaviors in an objectively non-threatening environment. This 
generalization may then present as maladaptive forms of reasoning, where mechanical reasoning 
is used in introspective/social processes, and where aspects of social reasoning are utilized in 




 Another manifestation of the disrupted neural binding of independent cognitive modes 
may be seen in literature supporting magical thinking and a belief in paranormal activities, both 
of which have been robustly correlated with a history of childhood trauma (Rogers & Lowrie, 
2016). Traumatic experiences may become so painful that an individual may lose ownership and 
dissociate (i.e., derealization, depersonalization) and these symptoms may become so 
pronounced that a victim may no longer desire to live in his/her own body. This may catalyze an 
externalization of identity whereby identity becomes embedded in the environment (Cozolino, 
2010), an example being inanimate objects acquiring a life of their own; likely projected aspects 
of an individual’s self. Therefore, it seems that being neurally bound to one cognitive mode at a 
time is necessary for adaptive living: something that individuals with PTSD may likely not 
experience in its entirety.  
Interestingly, Matthew Lieberman (2013) has argued that the overlap between social and 
self-processes in the DMN suggests not only that are humans interested in the social world but 
also that this interest is a biological disposition. Through shared circuitry, the DMN promotes 
cooperation, empathy, and working in groups. This would identify the DMN as a “cause, rather 
than a consequence, of our focus on the social world” (p. 21). In addition he has argued that “The 
self exists primarily as a conduit to let the social groups we are immersed in (that is, our family, 
our school, our country) supplement our natural impulses with socially derived impulses” 
(pp. 191-192). From this perspective, the hypothesis for the evolutionary emergence of the DMN 
would be to enhance the necessity of living in groups by promoting social harmony, as living in 
groups increases the potential for survival.  
In support of his ideas, PTSD results in a disengagement from social affairs, decreased 




to frequent reports of interpersonal difficulties families have with returning veterans (Laffaye, 
Cavella, Drescher, & Rosen, 2008; Ray & Vanstone, 2009; Wilcox, 2010). Social experiences 
are undoubtedly important in recovery from PTSD. In fact, lack of social support is one of the 
highest predictors of PTSD, and has been found to develop and maintain it (Nietlisbach & 
Maercker, 2009). Similarly, the absence of social acknowledgment was determined to be an 
important factor in trauma processing and recovery, as it increased the risk of PTSD.  
Moral Judgment and the DMN 
Given the types of self and social activities involved with the activation of the DMN, it 
comes as no surprise that moral judgment was also found to activate areas of the DMN (Eslinger 
et al., 2009; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Moll, Eslinger, & De Oliveira-Souza, 2001; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, 
Bramati, & Grafman, 2002; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger et al., 2002; Prehn et al., 2008; 
Reniers et al., 2012). Reniers and colleagues (2012) defined moral judgment as “the competency 
to apply moral values and principles consistently when making decisions in social situations” 
(p. 203). In reviewing studies conducted with veterans, Litz and colleagues (2009) discussed the 
impact of events that may lead to what they term moral injury, “Such as perpetrating, failing to 
prevent or bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and 
expectations” (p. 700). Their focus, then, is on the potential distress caused by participation in 
traumatic scenarios, as opposed to negative experiences resulting from being a victim. The 
rupture in one’s deeply held belief system progresses into inner dissonance and distress, 
interrupting an individual’s capacity to act in accordance with his/her values. If not addressed, 
morally injurious behaviors may consequently lead to an internalization of guilt, resulting in 




Self-harming behaviors…alcohol and drug abuse, severe recklessness and parasuicidal 
behavior, self-handicapping behaviors, such as retreating in the face of success or good 
feelings and demoralization, which may entail confusion, bewilderment, futility, 
hopelessness and self-loathing…most damaging is the possibility of enduring changes in 
self and other beliefs that reflect regressive over-accommodation of moral violation, 
culpability or expectations of injustice. (p. 701) 
 
It is fitting to note that intuitions and internal representations of personal norms and 
values are associated with activity from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) to the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC). As mentioned earlier, the mPFC has dense connections with the 
limbic system, rendering it a higher-order integrative region associated with identity (Cozolino, 
2010). Interestingly, these decreases were also found by Yan and colleagues (2013), who studied 
the resting states of veterans with PTSD. It is possible that increased activation in these regions 
is necessary during moral judgment, as it requires the recruitment of SRPs along with social 
cognition (Reniers et al., 2012). In conjunction with correlations between DMN and morality, 
mind wandering, an activity that has been associated with DMN activation, has been associated 
with the generation of meaning, which in and of itself has been found to support well-being and 
health (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
An integral part of human experience is the process of discovering and living a 
meaningful life. Morality is both internalized through early experiences and discovered with self-
awareness. For some, living a life of value becomes a conscious decision, whereas others may 
live without ever considering the meaning systems that play a role in their everyday decisions. In 
light of varying dispositions, the typical reaction to morally incongruent behavior is guilt and 
shame. Moral injury results in the disempowerment of pre-existing value systems, increasing the 
chances of meaningless and chaotic experiences, and consequently resulting in the acting out of 
impulses. Unfortunately, it seems this inability to contain impulses promotes a cycle that 




This cycle is particularly relevant in aggression and violence among war veterans with 
PTSD, who have higher levels of aggression and violence in interpersonal settings (Riggs et al., 
1998). In their review of seven studies, Riggs et al. (1998) further noted that this population 
viewed violence as an appropriate solution to certain conflicts, with some veterans deriving 
pleasure from the acts, despite the ensuing guilt. These specific impulse control-deficient 
behaviors along with increased psychopathic-like responses may represent a reorganization of 
mPFC activity (Reniers et al., 2012) and its altered relationship with the limbic system. 
Overlapping self and social processes serve as a platform for moral sensitivity. Their 
relationship makes it natural to infer that moral injury need not come from personal perpetration 
of morally insensitive behaviors. Just as neural systems of social engagement (i.e., mirror 
neuron) enable people to learn positive and adaptive behaviors from others, it is possible that the 
witnessing of moral transgressions made by role models, or the mere act of being ordered by a 
trusted official to commit a morally incongruent behavior, may become internalized and acquired 
as in internal conflict. The subsequent dissonance and doubt may become reflected in DMN 
functioning, consequently supplementing the detrimental cycle of PTSD. Repeated acts lead to 




Chapter 4: Conclusion and Discussion 
Methodological Limitations 
The most salient limitation of this review is the availability of research on the DMN. 
Although research on PTSD is abundant, it was not until the year 2001 that the DMN was first 
adopted as a viable construct (Raichle et al., 2001). To compensate for the latter problem, all 
available journals were considered when investigating the DMN and PTSD. This choice resulted 
in a sacrifice of quality, as journals vary in their degree of rigor. In consideration of this 
challenge, it is also important to take into account that the costly usage of brain imaging often 
requires a thorough examination of methodological procedures. Another possible shortcoming is 
the relatively small sample size encountered in research including the use of brain imaging, 
which may threaten external validity.  To obtain a more comprehensive outlook, relevant studies 
that examined the DMN, PTSD, and self and social functioning independently were additionally 
integrated as appropriate.  
Another related shortcoming is that there is still a lack of consensus on specific regions 
that make up the DMN, SN, and CEN. Although there are recurring nodes (such as the mPFC in 
the DMN), there is still debate as to precise neuroanatomical correlates. This disagreement 
resulted in the identification of some overlapping regions between and within the DMN, SN, and 
CEN. In this context, interpreted patterns from brain scans should be approached with caution.  
 A variety of etiologies may additionally result in PTSD. One may be a victim of PTSD 
via a variety of traumatic incidents, including but not limited to physical abuse, sexual abuse, 
emotional abuse, natural disasters, or accidents. Moreover this study included ten studies from 
China and one from South Korea. Given the lack of overall research, inferences were drawn 




different cultural backgrounds and manifestations of symptoms. A categorization of studies can 
be seen in Table 5.  
Table 5 
Etiological Categorization of Studies 
Natural Disaster Childhood Trauma MVA Veterans/Combat 
Jin et al. (2014)* 
EQ 
Tursich et al. (2015) Zhang et al. (2015)* Dunkley et al. (2015)  
Shang et al. (2014)* 
EQ 
Bluhm et al. (2009) Lanius et al. (2010) Sripada et al. (2012) 
Suo et al. (2015)* 
EQ 
Daniels et al. (2010) Qin et al. (2012)* DiGangi et al. (2016) 
Lei et al. (2015)* 
EQ  
Bremner et al. (1997) Bonne et al. (2003) Yan et al. (2013) 
Du et al. (2015)* 
EQ 
 Bing et al. (2013)  




Long et al. (2013)*  
Lui et al. (2009)  
EQ  
 Zhou et al. (2012)  
Zhang et al. (2011)* Coal 
Mine Flood Disaster 
Survivors 
 Chung et al. (2006)** 
18 MVA, 3 domestic 
violence, 2 physical 
assault 
 
Note. Patel et al. (2012) extracted data from 13 resting state studies, integrating findings on PTSD-DMN. Integrated 
findings were included in the study, however independent studies were not. In addition, Kemp and colleagues (2010) 
did not specify etiology and as such was not included. *China, ** South Korea, EQ: Earthquake, MVA: Motor 
Vehicle Accident 
 
Existing literature also indicates that individuals can develop PTSD from re-constructing 
events post-amnesia (Bryant, 2011) or through vicarious exposure to traumata. There is also the 
question of Complex PTSD. These sorts of experiences have yet to be investigated from the 
perspective of the DMN, and thus cannot speak for PTSD as a whole. Given the developmental 
state of the literature on the DMN and the difficulties in yielding clean results, this study 




differing etiologies and subjective experiences, symptomological manifestations are similar and 
reflected in underlying brain functioning.  
Conclusion 
This study explored the neurobiological and subjective sequelae of PTSD during resting 
state. The first research question posed was, What does the research literature tell us about the 
role of the DMN? The DMN, often known as the brain’s resting state network, has been found to 
be associated with autobiographical recall, self-referential processing, prospection, social 
cognition, and moral sensitivity. Brain regions associated with the DMN include the mPFC, 
bilateral temporal and parietal lobes, PCC, insula, and precuneus. Studies reveal that the DMN 
plays a role in processing information and can be characterized by its unique involvement in the 
self and social processes. The convergence of these processes contributes to an individual’s 
ability to experience and develop a differentiated self in the context of a social environment.  
The second question posed was, How does trauma impact DMN functioning? DMN 
dysregulation has been identified as soon as two days post-traumatic exposure. Traumatic 
exposure results in the emergence of the SN (i.e., insula, putamen, ACC) during resting states, 
along with general reductions in DMN (i.e., bilateral temporoparietal, PCC, and mPFC) and 
CEN functioning (i.e. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex). This generates 
a traumatized resting state (TRS). The nature of this merger results in internetwork rigidity 
manifesting as difficulties toggling between states of self-reflection/social cognition and task 
orientation. These difficulties are characterized by increased DMN functioning during task 
orientation and an increased orientation towards detecting salience (SN activity) during 
introspective states. Furthermore increased dissociations between frontal networks and the limbic 




suggestive of hyperactive limbic system and hypoactive frontal cortical activity. 
Neuropsychologically, the TRS results in poorer working memory, attention, and executive 
functions. Furthermore, interfering activity from internetworks likely results in the manifestation 
of social reasoning during moments requiring analytical reasoning, and vice versa.  
Reductions in volume, connectivity and activity of the DMN have been encountered long 
after traumatic exposure, despite stabilization of other networks (and resolution of anxiety) in 
victims of trauma. Furthermore, symptoms of depersonalization and derealization were 
associated with DMN incoherence. It is likely that the surge of neurochemicals facilitates an 
overconsolidation of the trauma. Dissociated and reduced hippocampal functioning may suggest 
an inability to re-process traumatic memories through discriminatory networks, subsequently 
impacting core processes of self and others. 
Compromised integrity of the DMN has been found to contribute to less detailed 
autobiographical recall, negatively biased self-referential processing (i.e., guilt, shame), 
inaccurate social cognition (i.e., ToM, emotional resonance), and reduced capacity for moral 
judgment (i.e., moral injury). Impoverished self-functions and social processes result in 
interpersonal challenges. Representations of moral transgressions, negativity, and shame may all 
become internalized, creating a new foundation from which victims of PTSD operate.  
In addition, PTSD victims experience discontinuities in time, as well as cognitive 
management challenges, leading to impulsivity and difficulties in accurately assessing the 
benefits of delayed gratification. These experiences lead to a variety of self and interpersonal 





From a developmental perspective, the DMN of PTSD victims appears re-configured to 
resemble that of an earlier developmental stage (7-9 year old). In conjunction with other 
symptoms, this level of de-integration results in an increase of environmental reactivity, and 
diminished potential for self/social reflection and development. With all these symptoms taken 
together, one can assert that trauma results in DMN dysregulation. Subjectively, core aspects of 
social and self-related functions become fragmented and replaced by maladaptive models that 
function within chaotic or rigid boundaries.   
Table 6 
Neuropsychological Profile of DMN Dysfunction: Traumatized Resting State 
Neural Functioning Description 
Reduced connectivity of mPFC and 
limbic regions. Hypoactivity in mPFC 
and hyperactivity in amygdala. 
Increased connectivity and activation 
of PCC with right amygdala 
Increased emotional reactivity, aberrant self-referential 
processing 
 
Threat, survival, negative biased processing in 
evaluation of environment and emotion mediated 
memory 
Decreased connectivity between PCC 
with precuneus, bilateral parietal 
cortex and mPFC 
 
Inaccurate (biased) and decreased capacity for 
evaluation of self, prospection, social cognition and 
moral sensitivity 
Reduced left hippocampal functioning  
Increase in right hippocampus  
 
Reduced autobiographical recall (context-dependent) 
Memory for locations (priming for action) 
Decreased activity in precuneus, 
mPFC and right superior parietal 
lobule 
Reduced capacity for self-reflection and biased 
prospection.  
Reduced connectivity with ACC with 
mPFC and medial temporal gyrus 
Dissonance between “oops center” with self-function, 
social cognition and moral sensitivity 
Increased Insula activity and 
connectivity with SN (amygdala) 
Poor interoception - exaggerated bodily response 
Reduced insula connectivity PCC Interoception is dissonant with evaluative functions and 
emotion-mediated memory 
Dissociated left and right amygdala  
 
Left: pleasant and/or unpleasant emotions, reward 
system. Right: negative emotions, fear and sadness) 
  
Overall, trauma alters large scale network functioning: SN intrusions in DMN functioning during 





This review synthesized the available literature on the DMN and PTSD, providing the 
research community with easier access to information concerning the relationship between them. 
The overarching aim of this study is to improve upon current understanding of PTSD in hopes of 
catalyzing better treatments.  
At its foundation, this review demonstrates that psychological trauma can alter brain 
functioning. Conversely, this understanding may serve as an opportunity to educate patients on 
the plastic nature of the brain. This may increase their hope for recovery, as a concerted effort to 
change may result in alterations of brain functioning. For example, the use of mindfulness has 
been found to alter DMN functioning (Brewer et al., 2011) and increase cortical thickness of 
right medial and superior frontal cortices and the insula (Lazar et al., 2005). In conjunction, the 
awareness of the DMN as an evolutionary design may help others capture the importance of 
introspective processes. In effect, this awareness could stimulate a greater desire for attunement 
to self, an easier access to an open and curious attitude, and increased sensitivity in relationships. 
Education increases awareness. Teaching a patient how the DMN plays a role in PTSD 
may reduce their uncertainties. The DMN provides a neurobiological model to guide treatment. 
Knowledge of the DMN’s functions (autobiographical recall, self-reflection, social cognition, 
and moral sensitivity) and its subsystems (vmPFC in the MTL subsystem: processing emotional 
features; the anterior mPFC and PCC: elaboration and experience of self; and dmPFC and the 
TPJ: social cognition) provides the clinician with further guidance on treatment that is founded in 
biology. The seeming developmental regression of the DMN of a PTSD victim may further assist 




reestablishment of connectivity between PCC-mPFC and PCC-left MTL: salient areas potentially 
distinguishing a PTSD victim from a non-PTSD individual (Supekar et al., 2010).  
Clinically, the development of a therapeutic relationship that enables appropriate levels of 
integration between and within the DMN can be seen as a neurobiological goal. To the author’s 
knowledge, there has not been any research supporting the use of medication to improve DMN 
integrity. In this vein, this study supports the necessity of psychotherapy in the treatment of an 
individual with PTSD. Narratives may assist in weaving DMN functions together, and may 
provide a route by which to improve upon DMN integrity. This may explain why trauma 
narratives are often used in treatment, along with the processing of sensations, images, feelings, 
and thoughts. Studies demonstrating insular-limbic connections may also increase the validity of 
the novel forms of therapy that emphasize the necessity to process bodily experiences associated 
with trauma, such as somatic experiencing or EMDR. In expansion of this concept, the added 
component of mindfulness meditation may assist in developing a healthy orientation to the 
present and a non-judgmental attitude, further promoting functional relationships within the 
mPFC and strengthening its descending inhibitory circuitry with the limbic system.  
Furthermore, it is important to highlight the DMN as a neural network bridging (the 
capacity and experience of) others and the self (BOATS).  Deficits in ToM, emotional resonance, 
and empathy will ultimately lead to maladaptive environmental expectations that can drive 
behavior. In this light, it is likely that the DMN mediates therapeutic phenomena such as 
projection, transference, and countertransference. Moreover, given the DMN’s relation with 
mind-wandering, it is very possible that the technique of free association may provide a gateway 




empirical science. These findings also lend further support for the use of psychodynamic and 
relational approaches of psychotherapy when working with PTSD.   
The importance of DMN functioning and its role in PTSD stimulates a dialogue on 
changes in identity and biases in self/social interactions. Understanding that human neurobiology 
may create illusory experiences may support an individual’s capacity to adopt a more 
exploratory approach, as opposed to an identification with such changes. Comparing how an 
individual related to the world in the past and how he/she currently relates to the world may 
facilitate a discussion that enables him/her to identify his/her traumatic experience as a 
representation that has infiltrated his/her pre-existing system.  
From the perspective of diagnosis and triaging, social impairment should be considered a 
primary cluster, rather than a secondary one. In this vein, attending to relational difficulties 
should become a principle focus during treatment. Such attention may include educating family 
members as well as PTSD victims on the importance of relationships as well as the signs that 
may emerge naturally as PTSD runs its course. Developing methods to improve expectation 
management would be wise. Another important factor to consider would be the use of family and 
group psychotherapy in the treatment of PTSD. The social sequelae of PTSD are clearly 
documented in the literature, and it would be wise to consider methods that treat social 
challenges. 
Another direct treatment technique may include the utilization of a chart or other means 
(such as an app) of increasing awareness of how victims of PTSD divide their time during resting 
states. Doing so may facilitate deeper insight, enabling individuals to act from a more informed 
place. Awareness of underlying processes facilitates internal stability. Moreover, this knowledge 




easy for such victims to lose track of time spent invested in certain activities, thus serving as a 
reality check. 
Discussion and Directions for Future Research 
Overall, PTSD and DMN dysregulation have been found to involve major areas of the 
brain; however, the degree of their involvement and levels of connectivity have been shown to 
fluctuate, as noted by Patel et al. (2012).  These variations may be due to environmental 
variables (i.e. environmental perturbation may impact DMN activity), inherent differences in 
individual development, the etiological variations of PTSD (i.e., vehicular accident, early abuse, 
natural disaster, or war), and the course of PTSD (i.e., traumatic exposure, onset, maintenance, 
recovery). Research has just begun to address these gaps and findings have thus far are 
promising (DiGangi et al., 2016; Du et al., 2015). Unfortunately, both of these studies did not 
systematically examine the potential psychological challenges reflected in their findings. 
Increasing current knowledge on DMN development over the trajectory of PTSD would be a 
very valuable path of research, increasing awareness in order to better treatment and potential 
predictive capacity.  
Notably, studies have also found that levels of DMN integrity may predict the severity of 
symptomology in PTSD patients, as well as the risk of developing PTSD (Lanius et al., 2010; 
Zhou et al., 2012). Although further research is necessary, this may introduce the notion of 
developing of an assessment measure that reliably assesses DMN functioning. As such, 
understanding PTSD from the perspective of the DMN may serve as a powerful diagnostic and 
prognostic tool. Such an assessment measure may help gauge the quality of DMN functions. In 
theory, this should also reflect the level of DMN integrity, which may then be further used to 




DiGangi and colleagues (2016) study warrants further research. Although their study was 
fascinating, it had several limitations, including: a small sample size, the use of a correlational 
design, a strictly male veteran sample, and a lack of correlation between combat exposure and 
PTSD symptom severity (clinical and functional relevance of reduced connectivity unclear). 
Moreover, the data collection was completed in 2012, and as such the DSM-IV-TR criteria were 
used. It would be interesting to examine what functional changes resulted from reduced DMN 
connectivity due to traumatic exposure. Their findings (in conjunction with Du and colleagues  
[2015]), may indicate that DMN dysregulation results in symptomology that extends beyond 
current PTSD criteria, beginning with traumatic exposure. It will be beneficial for this study to 
be replicated while accounting for these limitations, and determine whether an individual 
diagnosed with PTSD can be distinguished via his/her DMN functioning. Moreover, considering 
results from Tursich and colleagues (2015), it would be wise if future studies investigating DMN 
dysregulation include measures of dissociation (especially viewing depersonalization and 
derealization).  
Another interesting pattern encountered is the merger of the DMN and SN during resting 
state. The TRS is reminiscent of Baars’s (2002) Global Workspace Theory, whereby competing 
internal and external signals result in mind wandering. The difference lies in the simultaneous 
activation of the CEN (directing attention and working memory) during states of unaware mind 
wandering (Christoff et al., 2009), as opposed to the SN in PTSD. Could DMN dysregulation be 
understood as disorganized mind wandering rooted in trauma? This parallel may warrant further 
research. 
One central question of clinical utility is, How resilient to change is the DMN (and the 




research for both PTSD victims and the general public. Taylor and colleagues (2012) researched 
differences in DMN activity between beginner meditators and experienced meditators and found 
significant differences. One finding included a weaker correlation between vmPFC and dmPFC 
in experienced meditators, reflective of a reduction in emotional appraisal during self-referential 
processing, promoting acceptance of thoughts, perceptions, and feelings. Another finding is a 
stronger correlation between the right inferior parietal lobule and the precuneus, which the 
authors suggested is indicative of a reduction of self-referential thoughts and greater global 
attention and present moment awareness. Given the current knowledge that this neural network 
can be manipulated intentionally, PTSD survivors may greatly benefit from the instillation of 
hope. It is also interesting to note that having a healthy DMN is not so much about overall 
increased integration as it is about strategic levels and degrees of integration within and between 
the network.  
One fascinating study by Kilpatrick and colleagues (2015) explored how resilient 
personality characteristics may be reflected in the DMN and SN and how that may differ by 
gender. They found that increased connectivity between SN with several brain regions, including 
the right anterior insula, was significantly associated with resilient personality in men and 
women. Sex differences were found in the extent of functional integration in regions of the 
anterior DMN (aDMN) and posterior DMN (pDMN), with psychologically resilient women 
demonstrating increased functional integration in the aDMN and men in the pDMN. They 
speculated that both systems play a big role in self-referential processing; however, aDMN is 
more involved with emotion-cognition interactions, social cognition, verbal expression related 
functions, and socially guided decision-making. In contrast, the pDMN was more involved in 




functions. It would be interesting to study whether proportionally modifying approaches to focus 
on emotion-cognition would be more effective for traumatized women overall (or emotion-
memory for males). 
Another interesting concept proposed by Djiksterhuis, Strick, Bos, and Nordgren (2014) 
may play a subtle role in PTSD victims. They proposed that the DMN partially contributes to 
what they call Type 3 processing in addition to Type 1 (unconscious, fast, associative, automatic, 
and effortless) and Type 2 (conscious, slow, logical, rule based, goal-directed, and effortful) 
processing. They view Type 3 processing it as a “conscious intermezzi” (p. 360): a form of 
processing that is largely unconscious, very slow, abstract, exploratory, goal dependent, and 
largely effortless. They specified that two conscious intrusions bring Type 3 processing to light: 
(a) the awareness of an unconscious goal when progress becomes difficult; and (b) when an 
answer to a challenging question arises while doing something completely different, also known 
as a eureka moment. They view Type 3 processing as necessary in creative problem solving and 
making important decisions. They did, however, specify that working memory involvement is 
necessary, and as such the DMN is not solely responsible for all Type 3 processing.  
If this form of processing were indeed to exist as proposed, it would reveal further 
potential risks faced by PTSD victims: more specifically, amplifying challenges with problem 
solving and indicating further disconnects between conscious and unconscious modes of 
processing. It is interesting to note the DMN acting, once again, as a sort of bridge between two 
modes of processing. Inferentially speaking, one can speculate that PTSD would potentially 
prevent this type of processing from occurring, resulting in further challenges with prolonged 




whether this process becomes distorted or simply interrupted. How would that manifest 
behaviorally? 
Findings from studies have been consistent throughout different cultures thus far. It 
would be interesting if future studies investigated cultural variations in DMN functioning. Based 
on extant literature, it would seem that these variations would be slight. There seems to be a 
normative developmental trajectory in regard to the DMN and evolving self-social abilities. This 
trend suggests that humans are all related through this neural network. Further research in this 
area could include potential subtle differences in cultural adaptation to trauma and how such 
differences maybe reflected subjectively. Similarities and differences may then shed light on 
ideal DMN states that may be more resilient to trauma. The cognitive reserve hypothesis may 
also be an interesting avenue to explore in relation to DMN integrity and resilience. It would 
seem logical that an individual that grew up in a highly enriched environment may be able to 
withstand traumatic experiences better than individuals who have not had the privilege of such 
an environment as children.  
Further along the cultural continuum, there lies a necessity for humans to construct 
meaning and develop a sense of individuality: a long-held Western value. Given the emergence 
of the self from social experiences and the subsequent layering of self and social processes, could 
a deeper scientific understanding of the DMN contribute to inner values? In this light, it may not 
be so much about finding uniqueness in independence as it is about finding individuality through 
being related.   
From a neurobiological model, morally inconsistent behaviors made by attachment 
figures early in life become embedded in neural networks, resulting in the adoption of conflicting 




signals compete. It would be also interesting to explore moral injury in the context of conflicts 
experienced when societal and individual values are opposed to each other.   
As mentioned earlier, the dependence of self and social processes may also shed light on 
certain psychodynamic principles. Concepts such as projection, transference, countertransference 
and free association are well-known in psychodynamic theory, but have yet to be rooted in 
science. Understanding how the DMN may be related to such experiences will contribute greatly 
to psychological science.  
The study of how PTSD impacts the DMN has provided a deeper understanding of the 
human condition. It sheds light on the nature of self, relationships, morality, and how 
psychological processes can be deconstructed and reconstructed through biopsychosocial 
experiences. The benefits thereof, evident throughout this study, extend across the domains of 
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